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In the Tribunal of Conscience: Mills v.
Wyman Reconsidered
Geoffrey R. Watson*
In this Article, Professor Watson explores the historical record surrounding Mills v.
Wyman, 20 Mass (3 Pick) 207 (1825), one of the leading American cases on moral obligation
in contract law. In Mills, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court refused to enforce a
father's promise to compensate a Good Samaritan who had cared for the father's dying son.
Professor Watson combs the historical evidence--court records, census reports, genealogical
data, probate records, military rolls, and so on-and argues that the Mills court got both the
facts and the law wrong. According to Professor Watson, the father did not make the promise in
question, the son did not die until years later, and the law did not mandate the holding in the
case. Professor Watson then evaluates modem theories of moral obligation and argues that
none of them fully explains orjustifies the result in cases like Mills. He concludes by arguing
for reform of moral obligation doctrine, and more generally, of consideration doctrine. He
contends that promises should be binding if they are made with formalities indicating intent to
be legally bound
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I INTRODUCTION
A hundred years ago, Holmes admonished lawyers not to
confound law and morality. According to Holmes, a "business-like
understanding" of the law requires a sharp distinction between the
legal and the moral.1 "Nowhere is the confusion between legal and
* Visiting Associate Professor of Law, Catholic University School of Law; B.A.
Yale College, J.D. Harvard University. I would like to thank my research assistants, Michael
Kaibni and Roxana Wizorek, whose tireless treasure-hunting made this Article possible. My
thanks also for the helpful comments of Max Bloomfield, Lisa Lerman, Tony Perez, Heidi
Schooner, and Bill Wagner. Finally, I would like to thank Gary Powell, who sparked my
interest in this project.
I. Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., The Path of the Law, 10 HARv. L. REv. 457, 459
(1897).
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moral ideas more manifest than in the law of contract," he said.2
Contract law, he argued, simply compensates for breach; it does not
punish for moral failure. Eithe you perform or you pay damages.
One must look at the law as a "bad man" who wants to know simply
whether he will be liable, not as a good one who finds reasons for his
actions "in the vaguer sanctions of conscience." 3 "But such a mode of
looking at the matter stinks in the nostrils of those who think it
advantageous to get as much ethics into the law as they can."4
The moral obligation rule is a particularly pungent manifestation
of Holmes's theory of law and morality. This doctrine holds that
moral obligation alone is not consideration for a promise. The leading
American case espousing this doctrine is Mills v. Wyman, 5 a staple of
contracts casebooks since Langdell's first casebook was published in
1871.6 As reported by the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts,
the facts of Mills v. Wman were fairly simple. Twenty-five-year-old
Levi Wyman became ill and was cared for by a Good Samaritan,
Daniel Mills. Mills housed Wyman for two weeks and attempted to
nurse him back to health, but, despite his efforts, Wyman passed
away.7 Levi's father, "influenced by a transient feeling of gratitude,"
promised in writing to compensate Mills for his time and trouble.
Thereafter the father reneged on the promise, and Mills sued for
breach.9
Chief Justice Parker's opinion in the case foreshadowed the
theory of law and morality articulated by Holmes, who would sit in
Parker's seat seventy years later. The first sentence of the opinion
suggests Holmes's "bad man" theory. "General rules of law
established for the protection and security of honest and fair-minded
men ... will sometimes screen men of a different character from
2. Id. at 462.
3. Id. at 459.
4. Id. at 462.
5. 20 Mass. (3 Pick.) 207 (1825).
6. Compare C.C. LANGDELL, A SELECTION OF CASES ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS
367 (Boston, Little, Brown & Co. 1871) (reprinting Mills in its entirety), with CHARLES L.
KNAPP & NATHAN M. CRYSTAL, PROBLEMS IN CONTRACT LAw 165 (3d ed. 1993) (same), and
JOHN P. DAWSON ET AL, CASES AND COMMENTS ON CONTRACTS 234 (6th ed. 1993) (same).
Oddly, the most recent edition of the casebook I use has stripped Mills down to one page.
See E. A.LEN FARNSWORTH & WIujAM F. YOUNG, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CONTRACrS
67 (5th ed. 1995). It is an otherwise excellent book. See Geoffrey R. Watson, A Casebook
forAll Seasons?, 20 SEATrLEU. L. REV. 277 (1997).
7. See Mills, 29 Mass. (3 Pick.) at 209.
8. Id.
9. See id
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engagements which they are bound inforo conscientiae to perform.""
Justice Parker identified the father, Seth Wyman, as a bad man: "[Ie
has determined to break this promise, and is willing to have his case
appear on record as a strong example of particular injustice sometimes
necessarily resulting from the operation of general rules."' 1 The court
concluded that Wyman was morally, but not legally, bound to
compensate Mills, since Mills did not promise or do anything in
exchange for the father's promise.12  The court referred the moral
question to "the interior forum," the "tribunal of conscience. '1
3
A close reading of the historical record reveals a starkly different
version of the facts of Mills v. Wyman. Part II of this Article combs the
available evidence, including the original court records, genealogical
data, probate records, census reports, military records, and newspapers,
in search of the real facts of the case. 14 This section concludes that
Seth Wyman never made the promise that the court said he made, and
that young Levi Wyman did not meet the untimely death that the court
said he had met. Thus the court rightly absolved Seth Wyman, but for
the wrong reasons. Part II also uncovers other records from the period,
including evidence of Seth Wyman's considerable wealth, that raise
new questions about the motivations of the parties.
Part III traces the legal proceedings in Mills and argues that the
law did not mandate the result the court said was required. In an era in
10. id at 208.
11. Id. at209.
12. Seeid at212.
13. Id.
14. An explanation of my research methodology is in order. First I obtained copies
of the original record in Mills v. 11 ,man; those records are available at the Massachusetts
States Archives in Boston. I then obtained copies of every case and treatise cited in the
headnotes and opinions in Mills. I also obtained copies of later cases and treatises citing
Mills, as well as later law-school casebooks reprinting the supreme judicial court's opinion
in Mills. Much of this material is available in law-school libraries.
I next conducted a thorough genealogical study of all the major figures in Mills v.
W,man, including the parties themselves, the witnesses to the events in Mills, the doctor
who treated Levi Wyman, the attorneys at trial and on appeal, the trial and appellate judges,
and the court clerk. Much of this genealogical research was carried out at a Family History
Center of the Church of Latter-Day Saints just outside Washington, D.C. I also made
extensive use of the genealogical materials in the Daughters of the American Revolution
Library in downtown Washington, in the Library of Congress, and in the National Archives.
In addition, my research assistant traveled to New England to study the papers of the
attorneys involved in the case and to obtain further genealogical data on the Wyman family.
This genealogical research turned up relevant information in a wide variety of sources,
including birth, death, and marriage records; military records; college records; census
records; records of the Worcester County bar;, probate records; and deeds, wills, mortgages,
and other documents.
17511997]
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which law-making power had only recently passed from juries to
judges, the court missed an opportunity to shape a more sensible
doctrine of promissory liability. Part IV evaluates competing theories
of moral-obligation doctrine and concludes that none of them fully
explains or justifies the result in cases like Mills. This section argues
that a promise should be binding if it is made with intent to be bound,
regardless of whether a moral obligation or consideration exists. The
Article concludes with a discussion of Mills's place in our legal
culture.
II. THE FACTS oFMLts V. WYMAN
Levi Wyman was born on November 25, 1795, in Shrewsbury,
Massachusetts, a suburb of Worcester.15 He was the seventh and last
child of Seth and Mary Wyman.1 6  This Levi Wyman was almost
certainly the same sick young man whose medical expenses became
the center of the controversy in Mills v. Wyman. Levi's birth date
15. See ANDREW H. WARD, FAMILY REGISTER OF THE INHABITANTS OF THE TOWN OF
SHREWSBURY, MASS. FROM ITS SETrLEMENT IN 1717 TO 1829, AND OF SOME OF THEM TO A
LATER PERIOD 276 (Boston, Samuel G. Drake 1847) [hereinafter WARD, FAMILY REGISTER];
VrrAL RECORDS OF SHREWSBURY, MASSACHUSETTS, TO THE END OF THE YEAR 1849, at 114
(Franklin P. Rice 1904) (LC Call # F74.$63 S6) [hereinafter VrrAL RECORDS OF
SHREWSBURY]; see also MASSACHUSETTS VrIAL RECORDS (manuscript on file at the Library
of Congress Microform Reading Room) (recording the birth of Levi Wyman to Seth and
Mary Wyman on Nov. 25, 1795).
16. See WARD, FAMILY REGISTER, supra note 15, at 276 (listing children as Sarah,
Ross, Seth, Oliver, Mary, Clarissa, and Levi); VrrAL RECORDS OF SHREWSBURY, supra note
15, at 114 (listing children as Sally, Ross, Seth, Oliver, Polly, Clarisa, and Levi).
Levi Wyman and his father Seth were descendants of the brothers Francis and John
Wyman, who were bor in England and arrived in Massachusetts in 1642. Most of Seth's
direct ancestors settled in Massachusetts, particularly in the Worcester County area. See,
e.g., SAMUEL SEWALL, THE HISTORY OF WOBURN, MIDDLESEX COUNTY, MASS. 651-57
(Boston, Wiggin and Lunt 1868) (providing a genealogy from Francis Wyman to Seth
Wyman, grandfather of our Seth Wyman); 3 HISTORIC HOMES AND INSTrTUTIONS AND
GENEALOGICAL AND PERSONAL MEMOIRS OF WORCESTER COUNTY, MASSACHUSETTS 33-34
(Ellery Bicknell Crane ed., 1907) (linking Seth's son, Seth, Jr., to Francis Wyman); JOHN
HILLOFDORCHESTER, MASS., 1633, AND FIVE GENERATIONS OF HIS DESCENDANTS 78 (1904)
(linking Seth's father, Ross, to John Wyman); THOMAS BELLOWS WYMAN, THE GENEALOGIES
AND ESTATES OF CHARLESTOWN IN THE COUNTY OF MIDDLESEX AND COMMONWEALTH OF
MASSACHUSETTS, 1629-1818, at 1057 (1879) (linking Seth's uncle, cousin, and grandfather
to Francis); see also C.E. WYMAN & R.W. HUBBARD, GENEALOGY OF THE WYMAN FAMILY
FROM ITS FIRST SETTLEMENT IN AMERICA, TO THE PRESENT DATE 5-9, 20-23 (Grand Haven,
Mich., Harold Book and Job Printing House 1883) (describing the early family); BELLA
RISTINE WYMAN, WYMAN AND ALLIED FAMILIES GENEALOGICAL AND BIOGRAPHICAL 8
(1931) (describing John, Francis, and their issue); VINCENT D. WYMAN, WYMAN HISTORIC
GENEALOGY ANCESTORS AND DESCENDANTS (1595-1941) OF ASA WErHERBY WYMAN 15-43
(1941) [hereinafter VINCENT D. WYMAN, WYMAN HISTORIC GENEALOGY] (listing
descendants of Asa Whetherby Wyman).
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would have made him twenty-five-years-old at the time of his illness
in 1821, and the report of the case indicates that Levi was "about
twenty-five years of age" at that time.
17
Not much is known of Levi's childhood. He grew up in a
relatively prosperous household, on a homestead of more than a
hundred acres.18 It is not known what, if any, schooling he received.
Rolls of the Massachusetts Militia do indicate that one "Levi Wyman"
was called into service in 1814, at the end of the War of 1812, when
our Levi was eighteen years old." But this Levi did not come from
our Levi's hometown of Shrewsbury, making it unlikely that he is our
Levi.2° Other evidence suggests that Levi was still living with or near
his parents when he was nineteen years old. In June 1815, "Levi
Wyman" and Levi's sister Clarissa witnessed their mother's signature
on a deed of sale.
2
'
Sometime between 1815 and 1821, Levi left home. By 1821,
according to the trial court in Mills v. Wyman, Levi "had long ceased to
17. Mills, 20 Mass. (3 Pick.) at 207.
18. See VINCENT D. WYMAN, WYMAN HLSTORic GENEALOGY, supra note 16, at 17-
20 (describing Seth Wyman's land holdings).
19. See Muster Roll & Pay Roll, 2 Regiment (Waugh, Jr.'s), Mass. Militia (War of
1812) (unpublished document on file with the National Archives in Washington, D.C.)
[hereinafter Muster Roll & Pay Roll]. This Levi Wyman served a grand total of 11 days in
Captain Nathaniel Russell's Company of Infantry in the second Regiment (Waugh, Jr.'s) of
the Massachusetts Militia, from September 14, 1814 to September 24, 1814. See id.
Although he was called into an infantry company, he had the rank of ensign, a traditional
naval designation. See id He was paid at a rate of $20 per month, but his pay was prorated
to account for his service of less than two weeks. See id. Thus the amount of wages is listed
as $8.00, plus another $7.20 apparently allocable to "rations due." See iiL
20. This Levi Wyman listed his home address as Bloomfield. See Muster Roll &
Pay Roll, supra note 19. A Levi Wyman apparently did live in Bloomfield (later
Skowhegan), Maine, at about this time, and his father's name was indeed Seth Wyman. See
29 BIOGRAoPHCAL REVIEw 566 (1898). But this Seth settled in Maine, not Massachusetts,
and his first wife's name was Annie Stewart, not Mary Brown. Compare id. (describing the
Seth Wyman of Bloomfield), with WARD, FAMILY REGISTER, supra note 15, at 276
(describing Seth Wyman and Mary Brown of Shrewsbury).
21. See 205 WORCETER COUNTY DEEDS 202-03 (June 1, 1815). The deed conveys
60 acres of land from Seth and Mary Wyman to a John Davis of Holden in exchange for the
impressive sum of $1,200. See id. at 202.
The grantee, John Davis, probably was not the same John Davis whose partnership
later represented Daniel Mills in his suit against Seth Wyman. The John Davis named in the
deed lived in Holden; in 1815, John Davis the attorney (and later governor of the
Commonwealth) lived in Worcester, having moved there from Yale after his graduation in
1812. See ALONzo Hi, THE PERFEcr MAN. A SERMON ON THE DEATH OF HON. JOHN DAVIS
PREACHED AT WORCESTER, MAss. APRIL 23, 1854 (New York, Charles B. Norton 1854).
Moreover, the deed describes the grantee John Davis as a "yeoman"--a farmer-not an
attorney. See 205 WORCESTER COUNTY DEEDS 202 (June 1, 1815).
1997] 1753
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be a member of his father's family.' 2 Where he went, and why, is a
mystery.23 The next we hear of him, Levi was in Hartford,
Connecticut in February 1821, "on his return from a voyage at
sea ' 24 -indeed, on his return from a "foreign country"2 -when he
became very ill.
Precisely when Levi became sick is unclear. By some accounts,
Levi fell ill on February fifth at the house of Daniel Mills, the Good
Samaritan of Mills v. 5man: "one Levi Wyman at Hartford... on the
fifth day of February [1821] was at the house of [Mills] and then and
there fell dangerously sick .... ,26 Other accounts agree that Levi
became sick at Mills's house, but not until February twentieth.27 None
of the accounts says he became ill while abroad or at sea, though this is
surely a possibility.
The nature of Levi's illness is also a mystery. Court papers
provide some tantalizing details. The illness was a protracted one: by
22. Record, Mills v. Wyman (Ct. Comm. Pleas, Dec. Term 1824) (Howe, J.)
(unpublished manuscript on file with the Massachusetts State Archives, Boston, Mass., Box
203, 33.B.5, 826-28) [hereinafter Record, Mills].
23. A Levi Wyman does appear in the 1820 federal census for Connecticut. This
Wyman lived in Union, Connecticut, in Tolland County. See CoNNECrIcur 1820 CENSUS
INDEX 123 (Ronald Vein Jackson et al. eds., 1977). But it is unlikely that this was our Levi
Wyman, for a similar entry appears in the 1810 Connecticut census, when our Levi--then
age 15-probably still lived with his parents. See CONNECI r 1810 CENSUS INDEX 109
(Roland Vern Jackson et al. eds., 1977). No Levi Wyman appears in the 1800 Connecticut
census index. See CONNECncUr 1800 CENSUS INDEX 167 (Ronald Vern Jackson et al. eds.,
1977).
Massachusetts census records do show two Levi Wymans living in Massachusetts in
1820, both in Worcester County. One lived in Winchendon, the other in Hubbardston. See
MAssAcffusErrs 1820 CENSUS INDEX, supra, at 222. Neither appears in the 1830 census.
See MAsSAcHUsErrS 1830 CENSUS INDEX 274 (Ronald Vern Jackson & Gary Ronald
Teeples eds., 1977).
Oddly, these same records show a Seth Wyman living in Marblehead, on the North
Shore and far from Worcester, but no Seth Wyman in Worcester County. See
MASSACHuSETrS 1820 CENSUS INDEX, supra, at 222. The 1830 census shows a Seth
Wyman living in Shrewsbury and no Seth Wyman in Marblehead. See MASSACHUSET rs
1830 CENSUS INDEX, supra, at 274. Presumably this was Seth Wyman, Jr., Colonel Seth
Wyman's oldest son, who served as administrator of the elder Wyman's estate and inherited
much of his property.
24. Mills v. Wyman, 20 Mass. (3 Pick.) 207,207 (1825).
25. Id at 209.
26. Record, Mills, supra note 22 (Report of Abijah Bigelow, Clerk of the Worcester
County Courts). An essentially identical account appears in the Writ of Attachment. See
id.; see also id. (Judgment) (noting that Levi was "taken suddenly sick in Hartford").
27. See id. (Deposition of Nathaniel Wales and Norman Pease, Nov. 29, 1824).
Indeed, the doctor who treated Wyman once said he was not called upon until February 20.
See id (Deposition of J.L. Comstock, Nov. 29, 1824). Comstock's bill, however, says he
treated Wyman from 13 to 20 February. See id. (Letter of Daniel Mills to Seth Wyman, Mar.
3, 1821).
1754
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all accounts it lasted at least two weeks.8 Daniel Mills, the Good
Samaritan who housed and cared for Levi Wyman, arranged for two
men to guard Levi for four days and nights while Levi "was in this
derang'd state."29 Levi was so sick that "he leaped out of a chamber
window to the imminent hazard of his life, and to the very great alarm
of the family and the boarders. 3 ° Mills provided Wyman with "1
gallon Spirits '31 and with "pills" provided by a Doctor Linde.32 Mills
also hired John Lee Comstock,33 a prominent Hartford physician, to
care for Wyman. 34 Comstock found Levi "in a state of indisposition"
and, for some time, "in a state of delirium" that required two or three
persons "to prevent him from injuring himself. 35  Although Dr.
Comstock published dozens of books on subjects ranging from
mineralogy to Greek history to philosophy,36 he left little further record
of his diagnosis and treatment of Levi Wyman.
28. See, e.g., id (Depositions of Wales and Pease).
29. Id. (itemized expenses of Daniel Mills, in Letter of Daniel Mills to Seth Wyman,
Mar. 3, 1821); see also id (Depositions of Wales and Pease) (noting that Mills "procured a
Mr. Morton and a Mr. Powers to attend upon Mr. Wyman").
30. Id (Depositions of Wales and Pease).
31. Id (Letter of Daniel Mills to Seth Wyman, Mar. 3, 1821).
32. Id. (Bill from Daniel Mills to Col. Seth Wyman, Apr. 5, 1824).
33. Comstock was born in Lyme, Connecticut in 1789 and died in 1858. He served
as an assistant surgeon in the War of 1812 and eventually settled in Hartford. See generally
CYRUS B. CoMsrOcK, A COMSTOCK GENEALOGY 106-06 (1907); II FLORENCE S. MARCHY
CROFUT, GUIDE TO THE HISTORY AND THE HISTORIC SrrES OF CONNEncrr 677 (1937);
WHEELER PRESTON, AMEascAN BIOGRAPHmES 185 (1974); J. HAMMOND TRUMBU, THE
MEMORIAL HISTORY OF HARTFORD COUNTY CONNECrcUr 1633-1884, at 142, 172 (1886).
In 1817 he married Mary E. Chenward, the daughter of a U.S. Senator for Connecticut. See
LucIus BARNES BARBOUR, FAMILIE OF EARLY HARTFORD, CONNECTICUT 194 (1977); EDWIN
POND PARKER, HISTORY OF THE SECOND CHURCH OF CHRIST IN HARTFORD 373 (1892)
(church record of the marriage).
Comstock was a "prominent" physician. See JOHN ADAMS COMSTOCK, A HISTORY AND
GENEALOGY OF THE COMSTOCK FAMILY IN AMERICA 83 (1949); see also CHARLES W.
BURPEE, HISTORY OF HARTFORD COUNTY CONN CTICTrr 395 (1928) (noting that Comstock
had a "national reputation"). He was best known, however, for his huge volume of
publications. See TRUMBuLL, supra, at 142; see also infra note 36 (listing some of his
works). He also had an eye for drawing, and he made most of the illustrations for his books.
See I APPLETONS' CYCLOPAEDIA OF AMERICAN BIOGRAPHY 702 (James Grant Wilson & John
Fiske eds., 1968). He died on November 21, 1858. See 59 BOSTON MEDICAL AND SURGICAL
JoURNAL408 (1858).
34. See Record, Mills, supra note 22 (Letter of Daniel Mills to Seth Wyman, Mar. 3,
1821).
35. Id. (Deposition of John Lee Comstock).
36. See, e.g., JOHN LEE COMSTOCK, HISTORY OF THE PRECIOUS METALS (1849); JOHN
LEE COMSrOCK, INTRODUCTION TO MINERALOGY (1832); JOHN LEE COMSTOCK, SYSTEM OF
NATURAL PHILOSOPHY (1831); JOHN LEE COMSTOCK, HISTORY OF TmE GREEK REVOLUrION
(variously dated at 1828 or 1829), cited in APPLETONS' CYCLOPAEDIA OF AMERICAN
BIOGRAPHY, supra note 33, at 702. His System of Natural Philosophy went through 94
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Perhaps the most interesting aspect of Levi's illness was the end
of it. The Supreme Judicial Court pronounced Levi dead. It said that
Mills "acted the part of the Good Samaritan, giving [Levi] shelter and
comfort until he died."37 This finding might influence one's view of
the case, since Mills is a less sympathetic plaintiff if his ministrations
were ineffective.38  But the court's report of Levi's death was
somewhat exaggerated. 39 All available evidence suggests that Levi in
fact recovered and eventually settled in Springfield, Massachusetts.
On March 3, 1821, Mills wrote to Levi's father, Seth Wyman, stating
that "[i]t is with satisfaction that I can announce to you-that he has
recovered his health in a measure so far that he has left this place a day
or two since."4 In a postscript, Mills added: "Levi Started from here
and contemplated on going home by the way of Springfield should his
health admit-was tolerable smart when he left here."41  Two of
Mills's acquaintances, Nathaniel Wales42 and Norman Pease,43 also
spoke of Levi's "recovery."
44
Moreover, there is evidence that Levi survived for years or even
decades after the illness. In 1829 one Levi Wyman executed a
quitclaim deed in favor of Seth Wyman, Jr., administrator of the estate
of Colonel Seth Wyman.45 In exchange for five hundred dollars, this
Levi Wyman quitclaimed all his rights in the "Real Estate whereof my
Hon. Father Seth I4~man ... died seized." 46 Colonel Seth Wyman had
editions, was translated into many languages, and sold nearly 900,000 copies. See id.;
CROFUT, supra note 33, at 677.
37. Mills v. Wyman, 20 Mass. (3 Pick.) 207,209 (1825).
38. But cf Cotnam v. Wisdom, 104 S.W. 164, 167 (Ark. 1907) (permitting
restitutionary recovery by doctor even when patient died).
39. Cf JOHN BARThETr, FAMnAR QUOTATIONS 625 (Emily Morison Beck ed., 14th
ed. 1968) ('he reports of my death are greatly exaggerated." (quoting Mark Twain, Cable
from London to the Associated Press (1897))).
40. Record, Mills, supra note 22 (Letter of Daniel Mills to Seth Wyman, Mar. 3,
1821).
41. Id
42. Census records do show a Nathaniel Wales living in Hartford in 1810 and 1820.
See CoNNECTICUT 1820 CENSUS INDEX, supra note 23, at 114; CONNECTICUT 1810 CENsus
INDEX, supra note 23, at 101.
43. Census records show that many people named Pease lived in Connecticut in
1820 but that only a few lived in Hartford. No Pease in Hartford had a given name of
Norman. See CONNECTICtr 1820 CENsus INDEX, supra note 23, at 85.
44. Record, Mills, supra note 22 (Depositions of Wales and Pease); see also Curtis
Nyquist, Contract Theory, Single Case Research and the Massachusetts Archives, 3 MASS.
L. Hisr. 53,79-81 (1997).
45. See 264 PROBATE RECS. OF WORCESTER COUNTY 392 (Quitclaim Deed from
Levi Wyman to Seth Wyman, Jr., dated Jan. 9, 1829) [hereinafter Quitclaim Deed].
46. Id (emphasis added).
1756 [Vol. 71:1749
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only one son named Levi, the Levi Wyman of Mills v. Wman. What's
more, the deed mentions that this Levi Wyman lived in Springfield,
Massachusetts, the town to which he headed after leaving the home of
Daniel Mills.47 Incidentally, the deed also mentions that Levi now had
a wife named Lucinda. 8 One history of Springfield families indicates
that he married her on September 19, 1824, just seven months after he
left Hartford.4
9
Other evidence also suggests that, while Levi outlived the
Supreme Judicial Court's pronouncement of his death, he did not
outgrow his habit of getting into trouble. Worcester County probate
records from the 1820s and 1830s indicate that a Levi Wyman, a
spendthrift and drunkard, had been assigned a legal guardian50 In
1829, the Worcester County Probate Court appointed Henry Snow of
Shrewsbury as guardian of "Levi Wyman of said Shrewsbury, who
spends and wastes his estate by excessive drinking and idleness."'"
The guardian's accounting of Levi's assets suggests that this is indeed
our Levi Wyman, for the accounting mentions "One Bond for one
hundred and fifty Dollars, signed by Seth Wyman"--presumably Seth
Wyman, Jr.-and dated January 8, 1829.52 This was the day before
Levi executed the quitclaim deed releasing his claims to any of the
estate of his father.53 The only other property in Levi's name was "an
old riding Saddle worth about one Dollar."54 This Levi, like the Levi
Wyman in the 1829 deed, was married.55 He also had one or more
daughters.56 Again, it seems likely that this was the Levi Wyman of
Mills v. Wyman.
It is not clear why the Supreme Judicial Court thought Levi was
dead. No surviving court records suggest that he had died. Perhaps a
47. Compare id., with Record, Mills, supra note 22 (Letter of Daniel Mills to Seth
Wyman, Mar. 3, 1821).
48. See Quitclaim Deed, supra note 45, at 392.
49. See 3 THOMAS B. WARREN, SPRINGFELD FAMaLES 782 (1934-1935) ("Levi
Wyman m 19 Sept 1824 Lucinda Edwards").
50. See 142 PROBATEREcs. oFWORCESTE COUNTY 103 (Mar. 3, 1829) (Docket No.
67894); 194 PROBATE RECS. OF WoRcESTER COUNTY 196 (Mar. 3, 1829); 67 PROBATE RECS.
OFWORCESTER COUNTY 557 (May 28, 1829) (inventory of Levi Wyman's possessions).
51. 194 PROBATE REcs. OF WORCESTER COUNTY 196 (Mar. 3, 1829) (Docket No.
67894).
52. 73 PROBATE RECS. OF WORCESTER COUNTY 468-69 (Apr. 1, 1834) (Docket No.
67894) (Levi Wyman's Guardians Acct.).
53. See id.
54. Id.
55. See iL
56. See id. (describing arrangements for clothing and schooling of at least one
daughter).
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stray suggestion of counsel at oral argument influenced the court; only
the plaintiff's attorneys appeared in person. 7 But it would hardly have
been in Mills's interest to suggest that Levi had died while under his
care.
Whatever his physical health in 1821-sick or well, dead or
alive-Levi's financial health was indisputably wretched. He was a
"stranger" in Hartford, "totally unable to pay" for his room, board, and
medical expenses." Those expenses amounted to about twenty-two
dollars-a considerable sum in those days-and included six dollars
for fourteen days' board and lodging, three dollars for "Room pine &
Candles," one dollar for a gallon of "Spirits," six dollars in expenses
for the two men hired to restrain Levi, and six dollars for Dr.
Comstock's fee.59 Levi apparently did, however, volunteer that his
father Seth Wyman would reimburse Mills. He was "confident that
his father, Col. Seth Wyman, would readily pay" the bill.6w This
confidence was either misplaced or feigned.
Levi Wyman left Hartford without paying Daniel Mills a penny.
As Mills's acquaintances put it: 'We never have known of any
property of Levi Wyman since his sickness nor have we ever seen him
Since.' ' The date of Levi's departure is uncertain. That date is of
interest because it roughly corresponds with the date on which Seth
Wyman supposedly promised to pay for Levi's expenses. Mills billed
Seth for fourteen days lodging, but Mills didn't clearly indicate which
fourteen days were involved. One bill carries the date February 20;
another carries the date February 27.62 But on March 3, Mills reported
to Seth Wyman that Levi Wyman had "left this place a day or two
since, '63 suggesting that Levi had left Mills's house at the very end ofFebruary or even early March.
57. See Mills v. Wyman, 20 Mass. (3 Pick.) 207, 208 (1825) (noting in a headnote
that defense counsel furnished a written argument "in vacation").
58. Record, Mills, supra note 22 (Report of Abijah Bigelow, Clerk of the Worcester
County Courts).
59. See id. (Letter of Daniel Mills to Seth Wyman, Mar. 3, 1821 and bill of Dr.
Comstock). These figures changed slightly as the dispute progressed. In April, 1824, Mills
calculated the total expenses at $22.93, plus $4.50 interest. Levi's 14 days' room and board
was now assessed at $6.15. The bill reflected only two quarts of "Spirits," at a cost of 50¢.
It also reflected 13¢ "cash paid for Laudanum" and 15€ for "pills." See id.
60. IM (Depositions of Wales and Pease).
61. Id
62. Compare id. (Letter of Daniel Mills to Seth Wyman, Mar. 3, 1821), with id. (Bill
of Daniel Mills to Seth Wyman, Apr. 5, 1824).
63. Id. (Letter of Daniel Mills, to Seth Wyman, Mar. 3, 1821).
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Daniel Mills was not willing to let this bill go unpaid. He does
not appear to have been wealthy. Court papers identify Mills as an
"innkeeper" and a "yeoman, '" a term that usually meant a fanner.
Unlike Seth Wyman, Mills is never referred to as a "gentleman" in the
papers.6' Little else about Mills is certain. A "master mariner" named
Daniel or D.A. Mills lived with a Hetta Mills at a boarding-house at
118 Front Street in Hartford, near the Connecticut River, in the 1830s
and 1840s, but it is not clear that this was our Mills.6 6 This Mills
captained a steamship that shuttled between New York and Hartford.67
Census records are also inconclusive. They show a number of men
named Daniel Mills living in Connecticut at the relevant time, but
none in the town of Hartford 6 8 Military records are similarly
64. See id. (Report of Abijah Bigelow, Clerk of the Worcester County Courts).
65. See id.
66. See GARDNER'S HARTFORD CITY DRECTORY FOR 1838, at 32 (1838). A map in
this directory places Front Street about two blocks from the Connecticut River. Front Street
no longer exists.
The listed names and occupations of the inhabitants of 118 Front Street fluctuated over
time. In 1838, Hetty Mills's occupation is listed as "boarding house." l An 1844
Directory lists a "Hetta" Mills but no Daniel Mills, at that address, although a mariner
named Andrew H. Mills lived next door. See ISAAC N. Bol.ES, DIRECTORY AND
GuIDEBooK, FOR THE CrrY OF HARTFORD. 1844. WrrH A MAP OF THE CmTY AND A GREAT
VARIETY OFUSEFULMATrER 55 (1844). In 1847 a "D.A. Mills" is listed at 118 Front Street.
This Mills is described as the captain of a steamship and a boarder, not a landlord. Hetty
Mills still lived there; she is now listed as "widow, boarding house." See GEER'S HARTFORD
CrrY DIRECTORY FOR 1847, at 83 (Hartford, Elihu Greer 1847) [hereinafter GEER'S
DIRECTORY].
67. See GEER'S DIRECTORY, supra note 66, at 83, 150. D.A. Mills was captain of the
steamship UwcAs. See id. It was a steam schooner that, along with two other ships, shuttled
between State Street, Hartford, and the Old Slip at New York. See id. at 150. The UNCAS
was part of "Buck's New York Steam Transportation Line." Id& Two agents are listed: E.
Wadsworth of State Street, Hartford, and J. & N. Briggs of No. 40 South Street, New York.
See iUL A nifty logo of a steamboat with fore-and-aft sails accompanies the listing. See id.
Was this steamship captain the same Daniel Mills who sued Seth Wyman? There is at
least one reason for doubt. The captain was always listed with middle initial "A," and this
middle initial does not appear in any of the court records in Mills v. Wyman, even though
middle initials of other people-notably of Mills's first lawyer, John W. Hubbard--are
routinely recorded. Compare id. at 83, 150, with Record, Mills, supra note 22.
68. The 1790 census shows a Daniel Mills living in Fairfield town; his household
included two boys and six girls. See DEP'T. OF COMMERCE AND LABOR, BUREAU OF TmE
CENSUS, HEADS OF FAMILES AT THE FIRST CENSUS OF THE UNrED STATES TAKEN IN THE YEAR
1790: CONNECRiCUT 12 (1908) [hereinafter 1790 CENSUs]. It also shows a Daniel Mills in
Newtown; his household included one boy and one girl. See id. at 20.
The 1800 census has a Daniel Mills in Litchfield County, but none in Hartford. See
CONNECTICUT 1800 CENSUS INDEX, supra note 23, at 104. The 1810 census shows three
men named Daniel Mills living in Connecticut: two in Litchfield County, and one in
Fairfield County, but none in Hartford or Hartford County. See CONNECrCUT 1810 CENSUS
INDEX, supra note 23, at 68.
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unrevealing. They show that a number of men named Daniel Mills
served in the War of 1812 and in the Revolutionary War, but none of
these men came from Hartford. 69 Likewise, land records show that a
Daniel Mills sold property repeatedly in the town of Hartford between
1816 and 1825, but that is all that they reveal about this man.70
Anxious to be paid, Mills did not wait to contact Levi's father
until Levi had departed. In early or middle February, Mills contacted
Seth Wyman and advised him of Levi's condition. We don't have the
text of Mills's first communication to Wyman, but Mills apparently
suggested that Seth Wyman come see his son.7' On February 24,
while Levi was probably still at Mills's house, Seth Wyman
responded. This was the ostensible promise to pay Mills for services
already rendered and the writing on which the litigation in Mills v.
Wman turned. It is worth quoting in full:
Dear Sir
I received a line from you relating to my Son Levi's sickness and
requesting me to come up and see him, but as the going is very bad I
cannot come up at the present, but I wish you to take all possible care
of him and if you cannot have him at your house I wish you to remove
him to some convenient place and if he cannot satisfy you for it I will.
Although our Daniel Mills clearly lived in Hartford in early 1821, the 1820 census
shows no Daniel Mills living there. CoNNECIcuT 1820 CENSuS INDEX, supra note 23, at
76. Instead, it records one Daniel Mills living in Litchfield County and another in Fairfield
County. See id. The 1830 census does show a Daniel Mills in Hartford County, but in
Burlington and not the town of Hartford. It also shows two other men named Daniel Mills,
one in Fairfield County, the other in Litchfield County. See CoNNE cuT 1830 CENsus
INDEx 85 (Ronald Vein Jackson et al. eds., 1977).
69. A Daniel Mills served in the Connecticut Militia in the War of 1812 under the
command of Waiter Sherwood. He served in Fairfield from April 15, 1814, to April 17,
1814. See Tim RECORD OF CONNECnCUT MEN IN THE MILrARY AND NAVAL SERVICE DURING
THE WAR OF THE REVOLUTION 1775-1783, at 89 (Henry P. Johnston ed., Hartford, Press of
Wiley, Waterman and Eaton 1889). A Daniel Mills deserted Captain Andrew's Company
during the Revolutionary War. See id. at 515. Another served for two months in Captain
Bell's Company of the Connecticut militia in late 1776. See id. at 488.
70. See LAND RECORDs OFTHE TowN OF HARTFORD 392 (Hartford, Wiley, Waterman
& Eaton 1873) (listing Daniel Mills as the grantor on five mortgage deeds, three quitclaim
deeds, and one warrantee deed). Interestingly, this Daniel Mills never appears to have
acquired property; his name does not appear in this index as a grantee. See id
One hint that this Mills might be our Mills is the name of one of the grantees: Harvey
Pease, who received a quitclaim deed from this Daniel Mills on May 10, 1822. See id. One
of Mills's witnesses was a man named Norman Pease, who testified in a deposition that
Mills attended to Levi Wyman. See Record, Mills, supra note 22 (Deposition of Wales and
Pease).
71. See Record, Mills, supra note 22 (Letter of Col. Seth Wyman to Daniel Mills,
Feb. 24, 1821).
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I want that you should write me again immediately how he does and
greatly oblige your most obedient servant
Seth Wyman
Shrewsbury Feb 24th 1821
Mr. Daniel Mills
72
By this letter, Seth Wyman supposedly promised to pay Mills for
services already rendered, for so-called "past consideration." But the
letter does not clearly promise to pay for the services already rendered.
It seems more directed at procuring future services from Daniel
Mills-i.e., that he either "have him at your house" or "remove him to
some convenient place."73 Wyman can be more fairly said to have
been bargaining for future conduct and for real consideration than to
have been making a sterile promise to pay for past services. The letter
is understandably preoccupied with ensuring his son's safety hereafter,
not in settling his debts heretofore. Not surprisingly, when the case
72. Id. The letter was copied into the record by Abijah Bigelow, Clerk of Worcester
County Courts. That copy is reproduced below.
owl '-#/ /4.
A. ,
73. See id.
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came to trial, Wyman's first defense was that he never promised to pay
Mills for past expenses.74
Mills, however, interpreted Wyman's letter as a promise to pay
Levi's existing debt, not just an offer to pay for future services. Mills
was not concerned with arranging future accommodations for Levi.
Mills wanted Levi's bill paid. By the time Mills received Seth
Wyman's letter, i.e., in late February or even early March, Levi
Wyman was leaving or perhaps already gone. Anxious to collect on
his debt, Mills interpreted Wyman's letter as a guarantee of Levi's
existing obligations7 After advising Seth of Levi's departure, Mills
wrote:
[Levi] did not nor was not in any situation for to compensate me or
the Phisitian in the Senst [?] For my trouble and expense I shall
therefore agreeable to your Letter of guarantee make out any bill
against you which you will find annexed to this-amounting to-
$16.00-Which I can assure you is more reasonable than it otherwise
would have been-had it not been so unfortunate on your part-you
will have the goodness to enclose said amount and forward it to me by
mail as soon as convenient and oblige yours etc.
Daniel Mills
City of Hartford 3d March 182176
The letter included Mills's itemized expenses and Dr. Comstock's
bill for six dollars. There is no record of any response from Seth
Wyman. Mills repeated his demand, to no avail, one month later.77
Why did Seth Wyman decline to visit his son? Was he just an
uncaring father? His age may offer an explanation. Seth was bom on
April 5, 175878 in Shrewsbury.79 Thus, when Mills invited him to
74. See id. (Report of Abijah Bigelow, Clerk of Worcester County Courts).
75. See id.
76. Id (Letter of Daniel Mills to Col. Seth Wyman, Mar. 3, 1821).
77. See id (Bill of Apr. 5, 1824).
78. See VrrAL REcoRDs OF SHREWSBURY, supra note 15, at 114; MAssAcHusErs
VrrAL RECORDS, supra note 15 (listing Seth's birth date as April 5, 1758). Seth had several
siblings, one of whom died in infancy. Compare VrrAL RECORD OF SREWSBURY, supra
note 15, at 114 (recording births of three children named "Seth" to Ross and Dinah Wyman,
as well as the births of two other children), with id at 282 (recording death of "Seth" at age
six months in 1752).
Seth Wyman's parents were Ross and Dinah Wyman, also of Shrewsbury. See id. at
114, 282. Dinah passed away on November 15, 1759, when her son Seth was only 19
months old. See id. at 282. She was in her early 30s. See id. (stating she was "in her 34th
year"); WARD, FAMILY REGISTER, supra note 15, at 275 (stating she was "aged 32 and 8
mos."). But Seth's father Ross remarried and lived into his 92d year, dying in Shrewsbury
on September 11, 1808. See iL at 275-76.
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Hartford in 1821, Seth Wyman was almost sixty-three years old-not
a young man for his day. Perhaps when Seth wrote "the going is very
bad," he meant he was too frail to travel to Hartford, a trip of several
days.80 Indeed, Seth died on December 29, 1827, less than seven years
after the events in question, and just three months before his seventieth
birthday.8' There is no evidence that he traveled much at all in his last
years; he died at his home and birthplace, Shrewsbury.82 By that time
Seth's wife, Mary (Brown) Wyman, mother of Levi, was also weary
with age. She declined to serve as administrator of his estate "as I am
aged and infirm and not able to undertake the task myself."83 She also
may have been too weak to visit Levi in 1821.
Even when they were healthy, Seth and Mary were hardly world
travelers. Seth came of age during the War of Independence and may
have left home to serve in that war. Seth was often referred to as
"Colonel" Seth Wyman,84 and at least one source asserts that he did
serve in the militia.85  But military records do not indicate
unequivocally when or where he saw military service.86 Apart from
According to one account, Ross, grandfather of the sickly Levi, was a blacksmith, a
"stout, athletic man" who supported the Revolution and refused to work for Tories. He once
defended himself from impressment onto a British man-of-war by "snatching up a cod fish
with both hands in the gills, [and] beat[ing] them off by slapping them in the face with its
slimy tail!" Id. at 274 n*.
79. Shrewsbury was founded in 1717. See ANDREW H. WARD, A HSTORY OF THE
TOWN OF SHREWSBURY 1 (1826).
80. See Record, Mills, supra note 22 (Letter of Col. Seth Wyman to Daniel Mills,
Feb. 24, 1821).
81. See WARD, FAMILY REGISTER, supra note 15, at 484. Another source suggests
he was "aged 70" when he died. See AMERICAN ANriQUARiAN SOCETY, WORCESTER,
MASS., INDEX OF DATES N MASSACHUSETTS CETINELAND COLUMBIAN CENrnNEL 1784-1840
(available in the Genealogy Section of the Library of Congress).
82. See WARD, FAMILY REGISTER, supra note 15, at 484.
83. 211 PROBATE RECS. OF WORCESTER COUNTY 345 (Jan. 2, 1828) (Letter of Mary
Wyman to Hon. Nathaniel Paine, Assent to appointment of administrator, in the matter of
Seth Wyman, Case 67929). The couple's second-oldest son, Seth, Jr., was appointed
administrator instead. See 174 PROBATE RECS. OF WORCESTER COUNTY 274 (Jan. 17, 1828)
(Administrator's Bond, In re Seth Wyman).
84. See, e.g., VrrAL RECoRDS OF SHREWSBURY, supra note 15, at 282.
85. See IV HISTORIC HOMES AND INSTrrUTIONS AND GENEALOGICAL AND PERSONAL
MEMOIRS OF WORCESTER COUNTY MASSACHUSETrs wrrH A HISTORY OF WORCESTER SOCIETY
OF ANTIQUITY 136 (Ellery Bicknell Crane ed., 1907) [hereinafter HISTORIC HOMES] (stating
that Seth was a "colonel in the militia").
86. Revolutionary War records show that at least two Seth Wymans of
Massachusetts did serve in that war, but that neither was from Shrewsbury. See SECRETARY
OF THE COMMONWEALTH, 17 MASSACHUSETTS SOLDIERS AND SAILORS OF THE
REVOUTIONARY WAR 991 (1908). One Seth Wyman was from Haverhill, the other from
Luenenburg. See id.
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Seth's possible stint in the militia, there is little evidence that he
traveled much at all. After Seth and Mary were married at Shrewsbury
in August of 1782,87 the newlyweds settled in Buckland,
Massachusetts and stayed for six years.88 In 1788, they returned to
Shrewsbury,89 where they lived the remaining forty years of their
lives.'
It is also possible that Seth and Mary may have refused to visit
Levi because he had become estranged from his family. This
Records of the Massachusetts Adjutant-General from the War of 1812 show no Seth
Wyman enlisted in the Shrewsbury Company of the Massachusetts militia, or for that matter
in any other company of the Massachusetts Militia. See, e.g., RECORDS OF THE
MASSACHUSETTS VOLUNTEER MILITIA CALLED OUT BY THE GOVERNOR OF MASSACHUSETTS
TO SUPPRESS A THREATENED INVASION DURING THE WAR OF 1812-14, at 48 (1908) (showing
no Seth Wyman in the company from Shrewsbury and vicinity); id. at 446 (showing no Seth
Wyman in the Massachusetts militia at the time).
As this account suggests, the name Seth Wyman was rather popular in the nineteenth
century. Perhaps the most prominent Seth Wyman was a rogue who published a book on his
exploits. See SETH WYMAN, THE LIFE AND ADVENTURES OF SETH WYMAN: EMBODYING THE
PRINCIPAL EVENTS OF A LIFE SPENT IN ROBBERY, THEFT, GAMBLING (1843), cited in W.J.
BURKE & WILLD. HOWE, AMERICAN AUTHORS AND BOOKS 1640-1940, at 850 (1943).
87. See VITAL RECORDS OF SHREWSBURY, supra note 15, at 237 (listing the intended
wedding date as August 17, 1782); WARD, FAMILY REGISTER, supra note 15, at 276 (listing
year of marriage as 1782). As to Seth's religious background, see infra text accompanying
notes 170-171.
88. See WARD, FAMILY REGISTER, supra note 15, at 276. The couple's first child,
Sarah, was born in June of 1784, less than two years later. See id.
89. See id. By this time Seth and Mary had three children. See id. Their seventh
and last child, Levi, was born in Shrewsbury in 1795. See VrrALRECORDS OF SHREWSBURY,
supra note 15, at 114; WARD, FAMILY REGISTER, supra note 15, at 276. Thus, the seven
children were Sarah (born June 9, 1784); Ross (born July 7, 1785); Seth (born July 23,
1787); Oliver (born Apr. 9, 1789); Mary (born Feb. 28, 1791), Clarissa (born Apr. 7, 1793),
and Levi (born Nov. 25, 1795). See id. For a different account of the given names for Sarah
(Sally) and Mary (Polly), and a different spelling of Clarissa (Clarisa), see VITAL RECORDS
OF SHREWSBURY, supra note 15, it 114.
In 1790, according to census records, there were nine people in the Wyman household.
See 1790 CENSUS, supra note 68, at 235 (listing a "Seth Wyman" in Shrewsbury, along with
four free white females, three free white males under age 16, and, in addition to Seth, one
free white male aged 16 and older). By 1800, census records showed ten people in the
household. See THE NATIONAL ARCHIVES, POPULATION SCHEDULES OF THE SECOND CENSUS
OFTHE UNITED STATES 1800 (1959).
90. Deeds and probate records from Worcester County support this conclusion. Seth
Wyman was involved in at least 30 real estate transactions in Worcester County between
1780 and 1827. See GRANTEE INDEX 1731-1839 WH.--WY.-Y.Z. OF WORCESTER COUNTY;
GRANTOR INDEX 1731-1839 WH.-WY.-Y.Z. OF WORCESTER COUNTY. In every deed after
1800, he lists his home as Shrewsbury. See, e.g., 184 WORCESTER COUNTY DEEDS 6 (Deed
from Seth Wyman to Benjamin Goddard, Jr., Jan. 5, 1811; recorded Jan. 28, 1811) (referring
to "Seth Wyman of Shrewsbury"); 236 WORCESTER COUNTY DEEDS 304 (Deed from Seth
Wyman to Joel Nurse, May 5, 1815; recorded Jan. 20, 1824) (same); 263 WORCESTER
COUNTY DEEDS 573-74 (Deed from Jonas Hastings, Jr., to Seth Wyman, Apr. 6, 1824;
recorded Dec. 25, 1828) (same).
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possibility cannot be discounted, especially given the evidence that
Levi was later adjudicated a spendthrift who needed a guardian to
manage his affairs.91 Nonetheless, Seth's letter suggests that the father
still cared for the son. "I wish you to take all possible care of him,"
Seth wrote.92 "[1]f you cannot have him at your house I wish you to
remove him to some convenient place ... I want that you should write
me again immediately how he does ... . If Seth had disowned his
son, he might not have bothered to write back at all, and he certainly
would not have offered to pay for any further expenses. Even the
Supreme Judicial Court, no friend of Seth Wyman, thought he liked
his son enough to experience a "transient feeling of gratitude."94
Whatever his reason for not visiting Levi, why did Seth refuse to
pay the man who nursed Levi back to health? When Seth spoke of the
"going being bad," did he mean his financial rather than physical
health? Poverty seems an unlikely explanation for Seth's refusal to
pay Mills. Seth Wyman was a man of means who became a
moderately prominent citizen of his small home town. One source
offers this laconic description of his life: "He had a farm and built the
grist mill and saw mill. He was colonel of the militia, and selectman
of the town. He was a large lumber dealer."95 Wyman's political
career was short-lived; he served as a selectman for only one term,
from 1814 to 1815.96 But he owned a considerable amount of property
right up to the end of his life. Property records from Worcester
County, for example, indicate that he bought and sold substantial
amounts of real estate throughout his life.97 After his death in 1827,
his real estate holdings were appraised at $7,924 and his personal
property was valued at $2,033.76, for a grand total of almost
91. See supra text accompanying notes 50-56 (describing guardianship for the
"spendthrift" and "drunkard" Levi Wyman in the 1820s and 1830s).
92. Record, Mills, supra note 22 (Letter of Col. Seth Wyman to Daniel Mills, Feb.
24, 1821).
93. Ud
94. Mills v. Wyman, 20 Mass. (3 Pick.) 207,209 (1825).
95. HISTORIC HOMES, supra note 85, at 136.
96. See WARD, FAMILY REGISTER, supra note 15, at 81. Wyman was one of five
selectmen. See id. Seth Wyman did not leave office because of any term limit; other
selectmen held office for more than a single one-year term. See id.
97. See GRANTEE INDEX, supra note 90; GRANTOR INDEX supra note 90. Some of
the deeds involved significant amounts of land and money. See, e.g., 205 WORCESTER
COUNTY DEEDS 202-03 (Deed from Seth Wyman to John Davis, June 1, 1815; recorded Feb.
19, 1817) (recording sale of 60 acres of land for $1,200); 198 WORCESTER COUNTY DEEDS
476 (Deed from Seth Wyman to Elijah Brigham, Nov. 1, 1815; recorded Nov. 23, 1815)
(recording sale of 38 acres for $1,000).
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$10,000.98 That was a large sum of money in those days, far more than
most people earned in a year or even a decade. The probate court's
inventory of the couple's possessions suggests they led a very
comfortable life in the country.99
Still, Seth's financial situation was not perfect. He had sizable
debts. The administrator of his estate was ordered to sell $3,400 worth
of property to satisfy Seth's creditors.'00 In fact, the administrator
ended up selling almost $5,000 worth of real and personal property to
meet Seth's debts.10' Nor was Mary Wyman wealthy. She died with
assets appraised at $246.78.02 Moreover, although Seth bought and
sold property actively up until 1817, from 1817 until his death in 1827
he continued to sell real estate, but stopped buying it. 3 Perhaps he
sold land to keep cash flowing in as he grew too old to manage the
family farm and the mills he had erected on it. What's more, he died
intestate, even though he was survived by his wife, several children,
98. See 63 PROBATE RECS. OF WORCESTER COUNTY, 614 (Jan. 29, 1828) (Seth
Wyman's Inventory).
99. In addition to Seth's substantial real estate holdings, his inventory lists hundreds
of personal items, including the following: three yokes of oxen; one bull; nine cows; two
calves; one horse; one mare; 27 sheep; 24 lambs; 27 tons of hay; all sorts of farming tools,
including rakes, wheelbarrows, screwdrivers, sickles, and a gun; one buffalo robe; two
barrels of feathers; three barrels of vinegar;, 11 bushels of wheat; 75 bushels of potatoes; four
wine glasses; a loom; four pewter platters; several sets of clothes; and a healthy array of
furniture. See id. at 612-14.
Mary Wyman's inventory includes "One black Silk Gown"; a collection of other
clothing; "Seven Silver Tea Spoons" a cherry table; various kitchen items including a coffee
mill, kettle, and wine glasses; and a variety of linens and the like. See 67 PROBATE RECS. OF
WORCEsrER COUNTY 457-59 (Mar. 27, 1829) (Mary Wyman's Inventory).
100. See 263 PROBATE RECS. OF WORCESTR COUNTY 431 (May 1828) (Seth Wyman
Esq. Estate, Petition for Sale).
101. See The Account of Seth Wyman Administrator on the Estate of Col. Seth
Wyman Late of Shrewsbury Deceased 3 (undated unpublished manuscript on file at
Massachusetts State Archives, Boston, Mass.). Much of it was sold at a public auction on
June 7, 1828. See, e.g., 264 WORCESTER COUNTY DEEDs 418 (Deed from Seth Wyman, Jr.,
to Lewis Barnard, June 7, 1828; recorded Dec. 26, 1828; recording auction sale of pasture
land for $770.56); 262 WORCESTER COUNTY DEEDS 659 (Deed from Seth Wyman, Jr., to
Calvin Howe, June 7, 1828; recorded Dec. 23, 1828; recording auction sale of woodland for
$673.07).
102. See 67 PROBATE RECS. OFWORCE-TER COUNTY 457,459 (Mar. 27, 1829) (Mary
Wyman's Inventory).
103. Seth Wyman bought land in Worcester County no less than 17 times between
1780 and 1817. See GRANTEE INDEX, supra note 90. During same period, he sold land in
Worcester County eight times. See GRANTOR INDEX, supra note 90. Between 1818 and his
death in 1827, he stopped buying land in Worcester County altogether, but sold five
different pieces of property. Compare id., with GRANTEE INDEX, supra note 90.
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and a number of other living relatives.'0 4 The absence of a will again
suggests uncertainty about his financial situation. While Seth could
doubtless afford to pay Mills his $25, perhaps Seth's financial
circumstances had deteriorated sufficiently that he was willing to fight
a debt he did not think he owed. He took that determination with him
to his grave: Seth's estate did not pay Daniel Mills anything.
One question of motive remains. Why did these two men take a
twenty-five dollar dispute all the way to the Supreme Judicial Court of
Massachusetts? Granted, twenty-five dollars was a significant sum of
money, the equivalent of a month's pay or more, but it was not that
large a sum when compared to court costs and attorney's fees.
Moreover, not only did the Massachusetts court award costs to the
victor, as is the practice today; 05 it also still followed the English rule
on attorney's fees,'06 thereby magnifying the risks of litigation for both
parties. At the trial level, for example, Daniel Mills was ordered to
pay Wyman's costs and fees, which totaled $10.74, $1.50 of which
represented the attorney's fee.'07 When Mills lost again on appeal, he
was saddled with Wyman's costs in the Supreme Judicial Court as
well; these totaled an additional $9.94, $2.50 of which represented
defense counsel's fee on appeal, for a total of $20.68.108 In addition to
104. Seth's wife, Mary, inherited a third of his property as her dower interest. See 65
PROBATE REcs. OF WORCESTER CouNTY 371 (Sept. 22, 1828) (Seth Wyman's Widow's
Dower).
105. See, e.g., FED. R. Cirv. P. 54(d)(1) (stating that "costs other than attorneys' fees
shall be allowed as of course to the prevailing party unless the court otherwise directs").
106. Precisely why American courts moved away from the English rule is unclear.
See, e.g., RICHARD A. FmItD Er AL, CIL PROCEDURE 165 (6th ed. 1990) ("Mhe historical
reasons for [America's] early departure from the English rule are murky and largely
obsolete.").
107. See Record, Mills, supra note 22 (Defendant's Costs). This itemization was
submitted by David Brigham, counsel for Seth Wyman at trial and on appeal. Mr. Brigham
practiced in Shrewsbury and thus had to travel to and from Worcester for proceedings in the
Court of Common Pleas. The costs included four charges from proceedings during the June
term of court: 'Travel 20 miles" ($0.66), "attendance 6 days" ($1.98), 'Travel 20 in"
($0.66), and "attendance 6 days" ($1.98). They also included three charges from the
December term, during which the trial was held: 'Travel 20 m." ($0.66), "attendance 10
days" ($3.30), and "Atty's fee" ($1.50). These charges total $10.74. See id.
108. See Record, Mills v. Wyman (Sup. Jud. Ct., Apr. Term 1826) (unpublished
manuscript on file at the Massachusetts State Archives) (Defendant's Costs). Again,
attorney Brigham claimed costs for travel to and from Worcester for proceedings before the
supreme judicial court, which was riding circuit in Worcester. These costs include the
following four charges from proceedings in 1825, some or all of which were apparently
incurred during October term: 'Travel 20 mi" ($0.66), "attendance 1 day" ($0.33), 'Travel
20 i" ($0.66), and "attendance 5 days" ($1.65). Id In addition, Brigham claimed charges
for five costs in April term 1826: 'Travel 20 in" ($0.66), "attendance I day" ($0.33),
"Atty's Fee" ($2.50), "Copies of the Case" ($2.75), and "taxing & filing" ($0.40). IL All
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all this, Mills presumably had to pay his own attorneys; he was
represented by respected counsel at trial and by fairly prominent
attorneys on appeal, and they presumably charged similarly for fees
and costs."° Thus he paid out more than he expected to win. In
retrospect, it seems remarkable that either Mills or Wyman took the
risk of being saddled with costs and fees that exceeded the actual
amount in controversy. But they did.
IH. THE LEGAL PROCEEDINGS IN MILLS V. WYMAN
Daniel Mills brought his suit in the Worcester County Court of
Common Pleas in Worcester, Massachusetts in 1824."' A writ of
attachment issued in May, 1824,t and the case was set for trial in
June. It was continued until December, 1824, when it finally went to
trial before ajury.
together, these nine charges amount to $9.94, for a grand total of $20.68-all apparently
paid by the losing party, Daniel Mills. See id.
109. A fee schedule adopted by the Worcester County Bar shortly after Mills v.
1i man gives a sense of the prevailing rates. A "writ on demand" between $20 and $100
cost $2.50; a continuance cost between $2.00 and $5.00, depending on the court and matter,
a demurrer in the court of common pleas cost $4.00; arguing fees in that court cost not less
than $5.00; and arguing fees in the supreme judicial court cost not less than $10.00. See
generally Rule 10, Bar Rules, Worcester County, Mass., Sept. 2, 1828 [hereinafter Bar
Rules] (unpublished manuscript on file at the American Antiquarian Society, Worcester,
BoxlVolume 6, Folder 3) (setting forth a two-page fee schedule for actions in the court of
common pleas and supreme judicial court). These were set fees, and members of the bar
signed the document to indicate their adherence to them. The document bears the signatures
of all the attorneys involved in Mills v. Wyman except John W. Hubbard, who died after trial.
See id. (signature page). For the history of the local Worcester County Bar Association, see
GERALD W. GAWALT, THE PROMISE OF POWER: THE EMERGENCE OF THE LEGAL PROFESSION
IN MASSAcHuSETTs 1760-1840, at 46-47, 186-87 (1978) (describing its rise and fall).
Minimum fee schedules persisted into the twentieth century in many American
jurisdictions, but in 1975 the U.S. Supreme Court held that such schedules constituted
unlawful price-fixing under the Sherman Antitrust Act. See Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar,
421 U.S. 773, 791-93 (1975). Some foreign states still permit such schedules, however. See,
e.g., MARY ANN GLENDON ErAL, COMPARATIVE LEGAL TRADrIiONS 173 & n.8 (1994) (citing
German Federal Statute on Attorneys' Fees [Bundesgebuhrenordnungfur Rechstanwalte] of
July 26, 1957, as amended (establishing a basic fee for many legal services)).
110. Although Mills was from Connecticut and Wyman from Massachusetts, federal
diversity jurisdiction was unavailable because the amount in controversy did not exceed
$500, then the required minimum. See Act of Sept. 24, 1789, § 11, 1 Stat. 73, 78 ("[T]he
circuit courts shall have original cognizance ... of all suits of a civil nature ... where the
matter in dispute exceeds ... the sum or value of five hundred dollars, and ... the suit is
between a citizen of the State where the suit is brought, and a citizen of another State.").
111. See Record, Mills, supra note 22 (Writ of Attachment). The writ reads in part:
'To the Sheriff of our County of Worcester or his Deputy, Greeting. We Command you to
attach the goods or estate of Seth Wyman of Shrewsbury in the said County, Gentleman, to
the value of Fifty dollars .... Id. It continues with a two-page summary of Daniel Mills's
allegations against Seth Wyman. See id.
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The presiding Judge was Samuel Howe,112 who had been
appointed to the newly established court of common pleas three years
earlier. Before his appointment, he was regarded as a leading member
of the bar of western Massachusetts."' He was a solid but not
flamboyant attorney. Howe was a more effective advocate before a
judge than a jury; he relied on "sound reasoning," not "display."114
Howe's mind was more noteworthy for its "discipline" than its
"original intuition.""' 5 Descriptions suggest that he possessed the
steady temperament of a good judge, if not the brilliant imagination of
a great one.1 16 Even so, he did not find his work on this "court of
112. See generally Ru~us ELLIS, MEMOIR OF THE HON. SAMUEL HOWE 7-11 (Boston,
Win. Crosby and H.P. Nichols 1850) (describing Howe's early years). Samuel Howe was
born in Belchertown, Massachusetts, on June 20, 1785. See id at 7. His mother died when
he was only three months old. See id. at 7-8. His father, a doctor, was a surgeon in the
Revolutionary War. See id at 7. Young Samuel entered Williams College at age 16,
"carrying with him correct moral principles, a vigorous, healthy mind, and an ardent love of
learning." Id at 11. He apparently had a knack for mathematics. See id. In 1805 he
attended the law school at Litchfield, Connecticut, and in August 1807 he was admitted to
the bar. Seeid. at 11-14.
Howe began practicing law in Stockbridge, Massachusetts, and he married Susan
Tracy, daughter of a U.S. Senator from Connecticut. See id at 15. Shortly thereafter the
family moved to Worthington, Massachusetts, where Howe practiced law for 13 years. He
also served one term as a state legislator. Susan Tracy died in 1811, a day after the birth of
the couple's second child. See ELLIS, supra, at 19. In 1813 Howe remarried. See id.
In 1820 Howe moved to Northampton, and the following year he was appointed a
judge of the newly established Commonwealth Court of Common Pleas. Howe became
active in the Unitarian church and played an important role in the establishment of a separate
Unitarian congregation in Northampton from 1824-1825. See id. at 28-35 (describing the
religious conflict in detail). Howe's part in the controversy was "one of the most important
events in the life of Judge Howe." ELLIS, supra, at 28.
Judge Howe rendered his decision in Mills v. Wyman in December 1824. See Record,
Mills, supra note 22 (Judge Howe's decision). A little more than three years later, in 1828,
he died of illness in Boston. See ELLIS, supra, at 36-42 (describing Howe's illness and
death); see also 2 WnILIAM T. DAvis, BENCH AND BAR OF THE COMMONWEALTH OF
MASSACHUSETTS 289 (1974) (noting his death); COLUMBIAN CENTINEL, Jan. 26, 1828, item
no. 4570 (providing an obituary). He was only 42 years old. At his death he was
remembered fondly in a speech by Isaac Parker, then Chief Justice of Massachusetts and
author of the Supreme Judicial Court opinion affirming Judge Howe in Mills v. Wyman. See
ADDRESS OFCHIEFJUSTICEPARKER 9 (Boston, Nathan Hale 1828) (lavishing praise on Judge
Howe).
113. See, e.g., CHARLES WARREN, A HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN BAR 318 (1912)
(citing Howe as an example of leading lawyers in Massachusetts outside of Boston).
114. ADDRESS OF CHIEFJUSTICE PARKER, supra note 112, at 8.
115. ELLIS, supra note 112, at 51-58 (letter from Samuel Willard to Rufus Ellis).
116. Nonetheless, Howe's appointment to the reorganized bench apparently provoked
some resentment. It was "a trying situation, because the order of things was new, and the
friends of the old judges were dissatisfied." Id. at 25. Judge Howe eventually did earn the
respect of the bench and bar, however. See ADDRESS OF CHIEF JUSTICE PARKER, supra note
112, at 9 (noting that Judge Howe was a "popular judge" and that the bar was "full of his
praises").
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despatch" to be "enough to satisfy his love of judicial investigation."1 '1 7
The job "rarely offer[ed] occasion for the deeper researches" because
the docket was full and his was not a court of last resort.'
18
Judge Howe's "court of despatch" heard Mills v. Wyman in
December, 1824. As was the norm in an era without court reporters
and photocopiers, no briefs or records of testimony or oral argument
appear to have survived. The existing record consists of nine
documents, all of them handwritten copies of important documents:
the correspondence between the parties, the depositions of various
witnesses, the expenses of each party, a summary of the proceedings, a
copy of the jury's verdict, and a copy of the court's opinion." 9 The
copies are in the flowing hand of Abijah Bigelow,' 20 clerk of the courts
117. ADDRESS OF CHIEF JUSTICE PARKER, supra note 112, at 9.
118. Id. at.10. Judge Howe was so eager for "deeper researches" that he decided to
teach law. In 1823, he and Elijah Mills, a U.S. Senator, established a law school in
Northampton. The school was modeled after the lecture style of Howe's alma mater, the
Litchfield Law School. Howe was an "excellent teacher" who "attracted many students."
FoSTER W. RUSSELL, MOUNT AUBURN BIOGRAPHIES 90 (1953). After Howe's death, Elijah
Mills "lost interest" in the Northampton Law School, and it disbanded. See GAWALT, supra
note 109, at 153. Thereafter Harvard Law School hired John L. Ashmun, Howe's colleague
at Northampton Law School, as a law professor. A collection of Howe's law lectures was
published posthumously. See SAMUEL HOWE, THE PRACTICE IN CIVIL ACTIONS AND
PROCEEDINGS AT LAW, IN MASSACHUSErS (Boston, Hillard, Gray, and Co. 1834).
Attempts were made to establish three other law schools in 1828, the year of Howe's
death, but all three failed. Gawait attributes their failure not to competition from the
Harvard Law School, which had only two students in 1829, but to onerous residency and
other requirements imposed by the Massachusetts bar and courts. See GAWALT, supra note
109, at 154.
I know of no evidence that Howe's teaching colleague, Elijah Mills, was related to
Daniel Mills, the plaintiff in Mills v. Wyman. Nor is there any record of any motion that
Howe recuse himself from Mills's lawsuit on account of his affiliation with Elijah Mills.
119. See Record, Mills, supra note 22.
120. Bigelow was born in Westminster, Massachusetts, on December 5, 1775. He
studied at Leicester Academy and at the Academy at New Ipswich in New Hampshire, and
thereafter at Dartmouth, from which he graduated in 1795. He read law in Boston, was
admitted to the bar of Worcester County, and began practice in Leominster. He served as
town clerk and selectman in Leominster, then as a state representative. In 1810 he was
elected to Congress, where he served until 1815. In 1817 he was appointed clerk of the
courts for Worcester County, the position he held when Mills v. Wyman was litigated. He
resigned this post in 1833 and returned to the practice of law. He died on April 5, 1860. See
Letters of Abijah Bigelow, Member of Congress, to His Wife, 1810-1815, in 16 AAS
PROCEEDINGS 305-10 (1930); FRANKLIN P. RICE, THE WORCESTER BOOK 40 (1884); A.G.
Waite, A Biography of Abijah Bigelow (June 18, 1952) (unpublished typewritten
manuscript, on file at American Antiquarian Society, Worcester, Box/Vlume #1, Folder #1);
1 WnLUAM T. DAVIS, BENCH AND BAR OF THE COMMONWE.ALTH OF MASSACHUSET'S 267
(1974) (putting his death at Aug. 21, 1857). His portrait is below. FIvE HUNDRED PAST AND
PRESENT CrTIZENS OF WORCESTER, MASSACHUSETrS (Boston, Claflin, Worcester, and Black
1870) (providing the portrait).
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of Worcester County, who had served two terms as a Federalist
member of Congress from 1811-1815. Although Bigelow kept
detailed private records of his work in the Congress, mostly in the
form of letters to his wife,'2' his personal papers do not contain any
further details on the litigation in Mills v.
Daniel Mills's lawyer at trial was John Williams Hubbard.
Hubbard was born in Brookfield, Vermont, on November 22, 1793.
He graduated from Dartmouth in 1814.2 After studying law in
Vermont and in Worcester, he was admitted to the bar in 1817 and
practiced in Worcester until his death in 1825-while the appeal in
Mills v. Wyman was pending. 24 During the 1820s he was an officer of
the town of Worcester. He served several terms as a hog-reeve and he
also served on committees of some local importance, including a
121. See Letters of Abijab Bigelow, Member of Congress, to His Wife, 1810-1815,
supra note 120, at 310-406. The letters are especially memorable for their vivid description
of Washington, D.C., after it had been burnt by British troops:
The walls of the two wings of the Capitol remain, but the inside is completely
burnt out, and will probably be tumbling down.... The Presidential house, built
of stone, like that of the wings of the Capitol, has its outside walls remaining, but
the inside is thoroughly burnt, and much of the furniture in the house was burnt
with it. The long brick buildings on each side of it ... which were occupied by
the different departments of government, are also thoroughly burnt. ... The
British officers rode about the City with as little apprehension of danger, as if they
were in their own country ....
Id. at 389-90.
122. See Abijah Bigelow Papers (unpublished manuscripts, available at Manuscript
Division, American Antiquarian Society, Worcester, Massachusetts) (making no mention of
the case).
123. See GEORGE T. CHAPMAN, SKETCHES OF THE ALUMm OF DARTMOUTH COLEGE:
FROM THE Fr GRADUATION IN 1771 TO THE PRESENT TME, wrrH A BRIEF HISTORY OF THE
INSTrON 173 (Cambridge, Riverside Press 1867).
124. See INSCRnONS FROM THE OLD BURIAL GROUNDS IN WORCESTER,
MAssAc~nUSrrs, FROM 1727 To 1859: WrrH BIOGRAPHICAL AND HISTORICAL NOTES 97-98
(1878) [hereinafter INSCRIPTONS] (providing a biographical sketch). A two-sentence sketch
is provided in 2 DAVIS, supra note 112, at 434.
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committee to audit the town's books. Hubbard was a man of at least
moderate means; he held a Worcester municipal bond and owned real
estate in Worcester.125 One source says he was "[o]ne of the founders
of the Central Church in 1822. He was a promising young lawyer of
much ability. 1 26  Another adds: "He possessed a strong and well
cultivated mind, and had given evidence of talents and acquirements,
which, with health and longer life, would have ensured distinction."' 27
David Brigham was counsel for the defendant, Seth Wyman, both
at trial and on appeal. Not much is known about Brigham. Town
records show that two David Brighams were born in Shrewsbury in
the late eighteenth century. 21 One of these was probably counsel for
the defense in Mills v. Wyman. Brigham apparently practiced in
Shrewsbury for a number of years before and after the case.129 But he
did not leave a large mark on Worcester County history.
The plaintiff's case focused on Wyman's letter of February 24.
On that day, Seth Wyman "undertook and faithfully promised" to
reimburse Mills if Levi could not pay.130  Consideration for this
promise was the father's "natural affection" for his son; the "great
expense, and trouble in providing for and assisting" Levi; and the
plaintiff's undertaking to "take all proper care of the sd. Levi and
procure medicine and medical and other attendance."' 3' Brigham's
main line of defense was that Wyman never promised to reimburse
Mills for expenses already incurred. Brigham said "he never promised
the plaintiff in manner and form as he in the declaration of his writ has
125. "He owned an estate on Main street, comprising several acres on each side of
what is now Austin street." INSCRFIIONS, supra note 124, at 98.
126. Id.
127. WtiwAM LINCOLN, HISTORY OF WORCESTER, MASSACHUSETTS, FROM THE
EARLIEST SETTI ENT TO SEPTEMBER, 1836, at 247 (Worcester, Moses D. Phillips and Co.
1837).
128. See VrrAL RECORDS OF SHREWSBURY, supra note 15, at 21 (listing David
Brigham born on Aug. 6, 1777 and Aug. 15, 1786). A David T. Brigham was born in
Shrewsbury on August 5, 1806, and he did become an attorney, but not until after Mills v.
Wyman. See 2 DAVis, supra note 112, at 411. Yet another David Brigham reportedly died in
Shrewsbury on the eve of Mills v. Wyman. See MASSACHUSETTS SPY, Dec. 1, 1824
(reprinting an advertisement, dated Nov. 2, 1824, providing notice of probate of David
Brigham's estate).
129. For example, his signature appears on the Worcester County Bar's rules,
promulgated in Sept. 1828. See Bar Rules, supra note 109 (signature page).
130. Record, Mills, supra note 22 (Writ of Attachment).
131. Id.; see also id (Report of Abijah Bigelow, Clerk of the Worcester County
Courts) ("In consideration" of Wyman's promise, Mills "had before that time, viz. between
the fourth and twenty first days of the same February, incurred great expense and trouble in
providing for" Levi Wyman.).
1772 [Vol. 71:1749
MILLS v. WYMAN RECONSIDERED
alledged against him, and of this he puts himself on the Country."132
The record contains no evidence that Brigham argued lack of
consideration during the trial itself.
After a "full hearing," the case was submitted to the jury, and the
jury returned a verdict for the plaintiff.133 The record contains two
versions of the jury verdict. One, on a separate sheet copied by clerk
Bigelow, reads: "The Jury agree that the Plaintiff has supported his
action and have assessed damages to the amount of $26.95. Bernard
Fowler foreman.' ' 34 The other is more interesting. The record of the
case reports that the jury "find that the defendant did promise in
manner and form as the plaintiff in the declaration of his writ has
alledged, and assess damages for the plaintiff in the sum of twenty six
dollars and ninety five cents.' 35 In other words, this version of the
verdict contains a finding that Seth Wyman made the promise alleged.
This verdict cites no evidence to support this finding.
Wyman moved that the verdict be set aside. From Judge Howe's
opinion, it appears that Brigham argued that Wyman's supposed
promise lacked consideration. 36 The record does not disclose whether
Brigham also argued that the jury's factual finding, that Wyman made
the promise, was supported by sufficient evidence. After a hearing,
Judge Howe granted the motion and directed a nonsuit. 13  Judge
Howe explained that he "suffered the Jury ... to assess" plaintiff's
damages to save the expense of a new trial in the event the judgment
was reversed on appeal. 38 Apparently too busy to engage in the
132. Id.
133. See id.
134. Id. (Verdict). Not much is known about Bernard Fowler, the foreman. A
Bernard Fowler of "a very respectable family" lived in Northbridge, Massachusetts, in
Worcester County, in the late eighteenth century. WuAm A. MOWRy, THE DESCENDANrS
OF NATHANMIEL MOWRY OF RHODE ISLAND 127-28 (Providence, Sidney S. Rider 1878). We
don't know whether this man was the same Bernard Fowler who sat on the jury in Mills.
No Bernard Fowler appears in relevant census records from the period. See
MASSACHUSETrS 1820 CENsus INDEX, supra note 23. Little information on him was gleaned
from a search of genealogical records of various institutions, including the International
Genealogical Index of the Church of the Latter-Day Saints, the Daughters of the American
Revolution Family Research Library in Washington, D.C., the Library of Congress, and the
Worcester Town Records. Fowler's name does not appear on an 1825 list of jurors for the
town of Worcester. See Town Records of Worcester 1817-1832, reprinted in COLLECTIONS
OF THE WORCESTER SOCIETY OF ANTiQurrY (Worcester, Mass., The Worcester Society of
Antiquity 1893).
135. Record, Mills, supra note 22 (Report of Abijah Bigelow, Clerk of the Worcester
County Courts).
136. See id. (Judgment).
137. See id. (Report of Abijah Bigelow, Clerk of the Worcester County Courts).
138. Id. (Judgment).
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"deeper researches" he preferred, Judge Howe provided a brief, one-
page opinion that cited no authority for its conclusion. 39
His opinion began by asserting that Seth Wyman had in fact
made the promise alleged: "[A]fter all the expenses had been incurred
the defendant wrote a letter to the plaintiff promising to pay him said
expenses."'' 4 As noted, the letter is more plausibly read as a promise
to pay for expenses incurred after the date of the letter. It is not clear
why Judge Howe let the jury's finding on this point stand. There is no
surviving evidence that Seth made the promise alleged. True, early
American judges generally paid more deference to juries than is the
case today.14' In the colonial era, for example, juries had the power to
find the law as well as the facts. 42 But the jury's law-finding role had
largely disappeared by the 1820s. 143  Even if the jury's finding was
purely a conclusion of fact, it could have been overturned if it was
"manifestly against the weight of the evidence."'" Indeed, Howe's
own treatise on civil procedure supported the use of a sufficiency
standard in reviewing verdicts.' 45 Moreover, since the Revolution,
Massachusetts courts had become increasingly vigilant in enforcing
the express terms of a contract over any implied terms. The law would
"not imply a promise, where there was an express promise."146 It is
thus surprising that Judge Howe found sufficient evidence to support
the jury's finding that Wyman had promised to pay Mills for past
139. See iL
140. kl
141. See generally WL.AM E. NELSON, AMERICAIZATION OFTHE COMMON LAW 3-4,
20-30 (1975) (describing the power of colonial juries).
142. See id. at 21 (stating that pre-Revolutionary juries had "vast power to find both
the law and the facts").
143. The Massachusetts judiciary greatly curtailed the jury's law-finding power in the
first decade of the nineteenth century. See id. at 168-69; GAWALT, supra note 109, at 105 &
n.62.
144. Hammond v. Wadhams, 5 Mass. 353, 355 (1809). This rule again reflected a
recent diminution in the power of juries. In the colonial era, courts set aside verdicts only if
they had "no support" in the evidence. See NELSON, supra note 141, at 170. But just as the
jury's law-finding powers had waned by 1810, the jury's fact-finding powers had come
under closer supervision by judges. See id. at 169-70. Why this happened is a complex
question that invites further research. Cf A. W.B. Simpson, The Honvitz Thesis and the
History of Contracts, 46 U. Cm. L. REv. 533 (1979) ("[Wlhat needs to be explained is this
progressive dethronement of the jury ... ").
145. See SAMUEL G. HOWE, LECTURES ON THE PRACTICE OF COURTS 351 (1825)
(available at the Harvard Law School Library, Cambridge, Mass.).
146. NELSON, supra note 141, at 140 (quoting Whiting v. Sullivan, 7 Mass. 107, 109
(1810) ("One set of cases articulated more precisely than had been necessary in the colonial
period the dominance of express over implied contract")).
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services when Wyman's letter is more plausibly read as bargaining
only for future services.
Having found that Wyman made the promise, Judge Howe
declared: 'There was no evidence of any consideration for this
promise except what grew out of the relation which existed between
Levi Wyman & the defendant & thinking this not to be sufficient to
support the action I directed a non suit."' 47 Thus in one sentence Judge
Howe found the promise lacked consideration. The brevity of this
reasoning brings to mind the famous analysis from Kirksey v. Kirksey,
decided only twenty-two years after Judge Howe's opinion in Mills:
"My brothers ... think that the promise on the part of the defendant
was a mere gratuity, and that an action will not lie for its breach."'"
Daniel Mills appealed. After the death of his first attorney, John
W. Hubbard, Daniel Mills hired new counsel for appeal: the
prominent partnership of John Davis and Charles Allen of
Worcester.'49 Whether Davis or Allen or both argued the appeal in
Mills v. Wyman is unknown. The Supreme Judicial Court did not keep
regular records of oral or written pleadings at that time. Charles
Allen's surviving papers make no mention of the case."'0 Neither do
those of John Davis.'
We do know quite a bit about these new lawyers for the plaintiff-
appellant. Charles Allen 5 2 was in his late twenties when he and Davis
147. Record, Mills, supra note 22 (Judgment).
148. FARNSWORTH & YouNG, supra note 6, at 85 (quoting Kirksey v. Kirksey, 8 Ala.
131 (1845)).
149. See Mills v. Wyman, 20 Mass. (3 Pick.) 207, 208 (1825) (listing ". Davis &
Allen" as counsel for the plaintiff-appellant).
150. See Charles Allen Papers (unpublished manuscripts, available at Manuscript
Division, American Antiquarian Society, Worcester, Mass.).
151. See John Davis Papers (unpublished manuscripts, available at Manuscript
Division, American Antiquarian Society, Worcester, Mass.).
152. Charles Allen was born in Worcester on August 9, 1797. See LINCOLN, supra
note 127, at 248. Allen was born into a prominent family; his father had served as clerk of
courts and a member of Congress, and his grandfather Sam Adams was a household name.
See WORCESTER BANK & TRusT Co., FORTY IMMORTALS OF WORCESTER & rTs COUNTY 30
(1920) [hereinafter FORTY IMMoRTALS]. Allen entered Yale in 1811 but soon withdrew. See
id.; LINCOLN, supra note 127, at 248. One account adds that he nonetheless graduated from
Harvard College, but others omit any mention of his attending Harvard. Compare
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF MASsACHusErrs 29 (American History Society ed. 1916) (mentioning a
Harvard education), with LINCOLN, supra note 127, at 248 (not mentioning a Harvard
education), and FORTY IMMORTALS, supra, at 30-33 (same). Thereafter he studied law with
Samuel L. Burnside, and in 1818 or 1821 he was admitted to the Bar. Compare LINCOLN,
supra note 127, at 248 (mentioning 1818), with ENCYCLOPEDIA OF MASSACHUSMrS, supra,
at 29 (mentioning 1821). He practiced in New Braintree until July 1824, when he moved to
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took Mills's case. At that time, Allen had been in practice less than ten
years, perhaps less than five.'53 Still, he was known as a "leading
member of the bar.' 15' A grandson of the fiery revolutionary Samuel
Adams, Allen became known for his own "revolutionary nature" and
"marvelous power as an orator."155 He was a staunch abolitionist and
Worcester and became a partner of John Davis. He became a "leader of the bar." FORTY
IMMORTAiS, supra, at 30.
Allen represented Worcester in the Massachusetts state legislature for several terms
between 1829 and 1840. See DAN MORRIS & INEz MORRIS, WHO WAS WHO IN AMERICAN
PoLmncs 13 (1974); ENCYCLOPEDIA OF MASSACHUSETTS, supra, at 29; FORTY IMMORTALS,
supra, at 30. In 1842 he served on the Northeastern Boundary Commission, whose
delimitation of the U.S.-Canada border led to the Webster-Ashburton Treaty between the
United States and Britain. That same year he was appointed to the court of common pleas,
on which he served for three years. See ENCYCLOPEDIA OF MASSACHUSETTS, supra, at 29.
While he was on the bench, he presided over the "celebrated Wyman trial," during which he
clashed with the great Daniel Webster, counsel for the defense. See FORTY IMMORTALS,
supra, at 30-31. It is not known whether Seth Wyman was related to Webster's client,
William Wyman.
Allen served as a delegate to the Whig national convention in 1848, but his
disenchantment with the Whigs' stand on slavery led him to help establish the Free Soil
Party, and from 1849 to 1853 Allen served in Congress as a member of that party. In 1858
he became Chief Justice of the Suffolk County Superior Court and, shortly thereafter, Chief
Justice of the Superior Court of the Commonwealth. In 1860 he declined an offer to serve
as Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of Massachusetts, citing ill health. See FORTY
IMMORTALS, supra, at 31. He died on August 6, 1869, in Worcester, just three days before
his 72d birthday. See MORRIS & MORRIS, supra, at 13.
For more on Allen, see Charles Allen Papers, supra note 150. His picture is below.
FIVE HUNDRED PAST AND PRESENT CrizENs OF WORCESTER, MASSACHUSETTS, supra note
120.
153. He was admitted to the Bar in either 1818 or 1821. Compare LINCOLN, supra
note 127, at 248 (mentioning 1818), with ENCYCLOPEDIA OF MASSACHUSETTS, supra note
152, at 29 (mentioning 1821).
154. FORTY IMMORALS, supra note 152, at 30.
155. Id. at 31.
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later entered politics and served in Congress as a member of the Free
Soil party, which opposed the expansion of slavery.156
John Davis 57 was even more prominent than Allen. By the time
he and Allen had taken Mills's case, Davis had been elected to
156. See DICTIONARY OF WORCESTER (MASSACHUSETrS) AND TS VICINITY 74
(Worcester, F.S. Blanchard & Co. 1889) (noting that Charles Allen served in Congress from
1849-1853); FORTY IMMORTALS, supra note 152, at 31 (same).
157. John Davis, the son of Isaac and Anna (Brigham) Davis, was born on January
13, 1787, in Northborough, Massachusetts. See FORTY IMMORTALS, supra note 152, at 27.
He attended Leicester Academy and then Yale, from which he graduated in 1812. See 6
FRANKLN BOWDITCH DEXTER, BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCHES OF THE GRADUATES OF YALE
COLLEGE 461 (1912). He studied law with Francis Blake of Worcester and was admitted to
the bar in 1815. See id. Davis married Eliza Bancroft of Worcester in 1822. See id. at 462.
By 1824, when he formed his partnership with Charles Allen, Davis had become "the
acknowledged head of the profession in Worcester County." Id.; see also GAWALT, supra
note 109, at 114 (noting that in 1834 Davis, like Allen, was one of the wealthiest lawyers in
Worcester); WARREN, supra note 113, at 408-09 (1912) (listing John Davis as one of a
handful of lawyers who "brilliantly represented" Massachusetts before the Federal Bar after
1830).
In the fall of 1824, before the appeal in Mills v. Wyman, Davis was elected to the U.S.
House of Representatives. He served in Congress until 1834, when he became governor of
Massachusetts. In 1835 he was elected to the U.S. Senate, where he served until 1841. See
2 APPLETON'S CYCLOPAEDIA OF AMERICAN BIOGRAPHY, supra note 33, at 103-04. From
1841 to 1843 Davis served again as governor of the Commonwealth. One highlight of his
governorship was the visit of Charles Dickens to the Governor's Mansion in Worcester, an
event described in great detail by contemporary accounts. See, e.g., WORCESTER BANK AND
TRUST Co., HISTORIC EVENTS OF WORCESTER 31-34 (1922) (excerpting accounts from local
newspapers). A photograph of the mansion is set out below.
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In 1845 Davis returned to the Senate and remained there until 1853, when he retired from
public life. See 2 APPLETON'S CYCLOPAEDIA OF AMERICAN BIOGRAPHY, supra note 33, at
103-04; MORRIS & MORRIS, supra note 152, at 183; DEXTER, supra, at 462.
Davis was by temperament a conservative, first a Federalist and then later a National
Republican and a Whig. He was a consistent protectionist and, like Allen, staunchly
antislavery. See ENCYCLOPEDIA OF MASSACHUSETTS, supra note 152, at 80-81; DEXTER,
supra, at 462-63. He died in Worcester on April 19, 1854. See id. at 463.
For more on Davis, see, for example, John Davis Papers, supra note 150; THOMAS F
O'FLYNN, THE STORY OF WORCESTER MASSACHUSETTS 82-83 (1910); ALBERT FARNSWORTH
& GEORGE B. O'FLYNN, THE STORY OF WORCESTER MASSACHUSETTS 210 (1934); LINCOLN,
supra note 127, at 246-47, 326; FIVE HUNDRED PAST AND PRESENT CrrIZENS OF WORCESTER,
MASSACHUSErTS, supra note 120 (providing the photograph above).
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Congress, beginning a quarter-century of public service as a
congressman, senator, and governor of Massachusetts." 8 It is not clear
whether his duties in Congress, then not full-time, would have
prevented his active involvement in Mills.'59 In any event, he was a
more cautious and reserved lawyer than his partner Allen. "Although
he had little grace of manner and, because of his shaggy locks,
reminded people of 'a great white bear,' Davis possessed a kind of
awkward dignity which was impressive. Without being showy or
brilliant, he was convincing because of his sincerity and earned the
nickname of 'Honest John.'"' 6  Still, even Davis's admirers concede
that "[a]s a lawyer, Mr. Davis was not remarkable for extensive
reading,"'16 and that he was more distinguished as a statesman than as
• -7 -°I'
158. See DICTIONARY OF WORCESTER (MASSACHUSErrS) AND IrS VICINITY, supra note
156, at 74, 78, 80.
159. Certainly he remained active in local affairs. On May 2, 1825, for example, he
spoke at the dedication of Worcester's new town hall. See JOHN DAVIS, AN ADDRESS
DELPIER AT THE DEDICATION OF THE TOWN HALL IN WORCESTER (Worcester, William
Manning 1825).
160. ENCYCLOPEDIA OF BIOGRAPHY, supra note 157, at 134. Indeed, the "Honest
John" moniker is repeated in most recollections of his life. See, e.g., DEXTER, supra note
157, at 462; FORTY IMMoRTALS, supra note 152, at 27.
At his death, Davis was remembered as "The Perfect Man." See Ha.L, supra note 21
(title of his sermon on the death of John Davis: The Perfect Man). Not everyone thought he
was perfect, however. Levi Lincoln, a former partner of Davis and governor of
Massachusetts, thought that Davis had used his office as governor "improperly" to achieve
election to the Senate. See 15 PROCEEDINGS OF THE MASS. HISTORICAL SOCIETY 235 (1902)
(Letter from Levi Lincoln to U.S. Senate, Feb. 14, 1827).
161. Thomas Kinnicutt, Memoir of Hon. John Davis, LL.D. (Apr. 26, 1854), in 3
TRANSACnONS AND COUCTONS OF THE AMERCAN ANTIQUARIAN SocmrY 345, 348
(Cambridge, Bolles and Hayhton 1850).
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an attorney. His strength was clarity and organization, not imagination
or brilliance. But he was successful with New Englanders, who were
purportedly more interested in substance than style."62
Davis and Allen were not successful with the three New England
justices who heard their appeal. Chief Justice Isaac Parker, 63 writing
for a unanimous panel,' 6 held that Seth Wyman was not liable to
Daniel Mills.' 65 Like Judge Howe, Justice Parker assumed that Seth
Wyman made the promise at issue.166 Nowhere in the opinion does he
quote the actual text of Seth's February 24 letter, the only document
that even arguably evidences a promise to pay for Levi's expenses. 67
Justice Parker even attributed motives to Seth Wyman that may not
fairly explain Wyman's behavior. Wyman, he wrote, was "influenced
by a transient feeling of gratitude.' ' 68  He made a promise and then
was "determined to break this promise, and is willing to have his case
appear on record as a strong example of particular injustice sometimes
His mind was well stored with legal principles; and he seldom failed of
making a just application of them in practice.... [Though he never permitted
himself to be surprised by the citation of cases which he had not seen, he relied
more upon well-settled principles, and the deductions logically made from them
by his own rmind, than upon the citation of any number of analogous authorities.
Id
162. See id
163. Justice Parker was born in Boston on June 17, 1768. He graduated from
Harvard in 1786, entered the practice of law, and in 1796 was elected a member of
Congress. He declined re-election in 1798 and was instead appointed Marshal of the
District of Maine. In 1806 he was appointed to the supreme judicial court, and in 1814 he
was appointed Chief Justice of Massachusetts. He was the first Royall Professor of Law at
Harvard University, and his plan for the establishment of a Harvard Law School was
adopted in 1817. Parker served as Chief Justice until the end of his life, in 1830, when he
was suddenly taken ill while at his home in Boston. See FREDERIC HATHAWAY CHASE,
LEMUEL SHAW CHIEF JUSTICE OF THE SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT OF MASSACHUSETrS 1830-
1860, at 53, 79, 134 (1918) (describing various events in Parker's life). See generally JOHN
G. PALFREY, A SERMON PREACHED IN THE CHURCH IN BRATLE SQUARE (Boston, Nathan
Hale and Gray & Bowen 1830) (containing a eulogy and a biographical sketch); RUSSELL,
supra note 118, at 126; Lemuel Shaw, Address, MASS. L.Q., Sept. 16, 1930, at 1 (giving an
account of Parker's life by Parker's successor).
This Isaac Parker is not to be confused with the "hanging judge" Isaac Parker of the
American West. See, e.g., HENRY SINCLAIR DRAGo, OUTLAws ON HORSEBACK 114 (1964)
(noting that the western Judge Parker sentenced 88 men to death by hanging).
164. The other two justices on the panel were Samuel Wilde and Robert Putnam.
165. See Mills v. Wyman, 20 Mass. (3 Pick.) 207,212 (1825).
166. See id. at 209.
167. Seeki.
168. Id
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necessary resulting from the operation of general rules."'169 As noted,
the facts suggest less despicable motives. Wyman did not make the
promise and thus never "determined" to break any promise. Wyman's
"transient feeling of gratitude" might have been a sincere expression of
willingness to pay for Levi's future expenses, but not his past ones.
Wyman's "willingness" to stand as an example of an "injustice" was
more likely a determination to fight for his rights.
One of my former colleagues once speculated that Seth Wyman
might have been Jewish and that Chief Justice Parker's
characterization of Seth was influenced by anti-Semitism. It appears,
however, that Seth was Christian. Probate records indicate that Seth
Wyman owned a "pew at the Congregational Church."'17 Moreover, a
Wyman genealogy, though it records no baptism of Seth or Levi
themselves, refers to baptisms of Seth Wyman's siblings and older
relatives. For example, according to this source, Seth's half-sister
Susanna was "baptized" on September 30, 1764, and died young
1 71
For whatever reason, Chief Justice Parker assumed that Wyman
had made a promise and callously reneged on it. Justice Parker then
turned to the central legal question in the case: whether the ostensible
promise was supported by consideration. As most first-year law
students learn, his answer was no. He began by acknowledging that
"some authorities" lay down a broad rule that "a moral obligation is a
sufficient consideration to support an express promise.' ' 72 He added,
however, that this "rule" applied only to promises reviving past
obligations that had become "inoperative by positive law."'173 Thus,
the courts would enforce a promise to pay a pre-existing debt
otherwise barred by the statute of limitations, infancy, and bankruptcy,
even if no new consideration were given for the promise. Like some
earlier authorities, Chief Justice Parker explained these cases with a
"revival" or "waiver" theory: "They are not promises to pay
something for nothing; not naked pacts, but the voluntary revival or
creation of obligations which before existed in natural law .... 174 In
169. 1d. More generally, the requirement of consideration "cannot be departed from
to suit particular cases in which a refusal to perform such a promise may be disgraceful." Id.
at 209.
170. Interestingly, in accordance with the dower rules, Seth's wife Mary inherited
one-third of his interest in this pew upon his death. See 65 PROBATE RECS. OF WORCESTER
COUNTY 371 (Sept. 22, 1828) (Seth Wyman's Widow's Dower).
171. See IV HISTORIC HoMEs, supra note 85, at 136.
172. Mills, 20 Mass. (3 Pick.) at 209.
173. Id.
174. Id. at 210.
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other words, the promisor can unilaterally waive a technical defense to
enforcement of an otherwise valid claim against him or her, just as a
party to a contract can unilaterally waive a condition that otherwise
might provide him or her with a technical defense. Because Seth
Wyman himself owed no prior debt to Daniel Mills, he could not
voluntary "revive" it. "[T]he law of society has left most of such
obligations to the interior forum, as the tribunal of conscience has been
aptly called." 17
5
This result was right even if the facts were wrong. If Seth
Wyman did not make the promise in question, he certainly would not
have been liable for breach of contract and probably would not have
been liable in restitution either. Daniel Mills would have had to
overcome both the traditional requirement that Seth Wyman himself
benefited by Mills's acts and the presumption that Mills acted
gratuitously. Because Seth was no longer legally responsible for the
necessaries of his adult son, it seems unlikely that a court would have
held him liable in restitution. Indeed the courts in Mills did not even
appear to consider this a possibility. That Levi actually survived adds
some weight to Mills's restitution claim, but probably not enough to
overcome these doctrinal hurdles.
If Wyman did make the promise in question, however, the court
let him off too easily, and in so doing missed an opportunity to reform
the doctrine of consideration. The law on moral obligation was not as
settled at the time as the court implied. English authorities were still
struggling with the scope of moral-obligation doctrine and indeed with
the consideration doctrine itself. In a 1765 case, the influential Lord
Mansfield announced a drastic reform of the doctrine of consideration.
When an agreement was reduced to writing, he said, "there was no
objection to the want of consideration.... In commercial cases
amongst merchants, the want of consideration is not an objection.' 76
175. I The court also disposed of the plaintiff's efforts to invoke a Massachusetts
statute obliging family members to support their poor relations in certain circumstances.
The court held the statute inapplicable because no court had found that Levi had a "legal
settlement" in Massachusetts or that Seth had the ability to pay. See id. at 212. Incidentally,
Davis and Allen cited the statute as the "statute of 1793, c. 59," see id. at 207, but the
provision in question seems to have been in chapter 58.
176. Pillans & Rose v. Van Mierop & Hopkins, 3 Burr. 1663, 1669 (K.B. 1765).
Oddly, the report of Mills v. Wy5man indicates that Mills's attorney did not cite Van Mierop
but that Wyman's attorney did-just the opposite of what one might expect. See Mills, 20
Mass. (3 Pick.) at 208. Brigham, counsel for Wyman, apparently sought to distinguish the
case on the grounds that a promissory note is a "privileged contract" and not subject to the
normal consideration rules. See id.
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In 1778 this new rule was rejected by English authorities,177 but
Mansfield's view retained lingering importance in America, both
because news of the rejection did not reach America until after the turn
of the century 178 and because of the "congeniality of Mansfield's ...
views to American judges.' 179
Moreover, Lord Mansfield kept up his assault on the
consideration doctrine and, in particular, on moral-obligation doctrine.
In a 1785 case he declared: "Where a man is under a moral obligation,
which no Court of Law or Equity can inforce, and promises, the
honesty and rectitude of the thing is a consideration.' 80  Lord
Mansfield gave as examples promises to revive antecedent debts, but
his statement of the "rule" was not explicitly limited to these cases.
Lord Mansfield's broad statement of the rule met with resistance. In
the early nineteenth century, writers went to great trouble to show that
Lord Mansfield really intended to limit his dictum to cases of
antecedent debt. In 1802, for example, the reporter of the English case
Wennall v. Adney wrote, "Lord Mansfield appears to have used the
term moral obligation not as expressive of any vague and undefined
claim arising from the nearness of relationship, but of those imperative
duties which would be enforceable by law, were it not for some
positive rule."' 8'
In fact, courts had often enforced promises involving nothing
more than past consideration. 8 2 True, many English and American
cases, including most of those cited in the report of the attorneys'
arguments in Mills, did distinguish between promises to revive past
debts and "naked" promises to reward past good deeds. 3 Cases
177. FARNSWORTH & YOUNG, supra note 6, at 61 (quoting Rann v. Huges, 101 Eng.
Rep. 1014 (1778) ("If [contracts] be... written and not specialties, they are parol, and a
consideration must be proved.")).
178. See Morton J. Horwitz, The Historical Foundations of Modem Contract Law,
87 HAsV. L. REv. 917,943 (1974).
179. Ra
180. E. ALLAN FARNswoRTH & WLLiAMS R YOUNG, CASES AND MATERIALS ON
CoNTRAcTs 120 (4th ed. 1988) (quoting Hawkes v. Saunders, 98 Eng. Rep. 1091 (1782)).
181. Wennall v. Adney, 3 Bos. & Pul. 247, 249 n. (1802). He added this:
"[H]owever general the expressions used by Lord Mansfield may at first sight appear, yet the
instances adduced by him as illustrative of the rule of law, do not carry that rule beyond ...
its proper limits" of antecedent debt. Id.
182. See 1A ARTHUR L. CORBIN, CORDiN ON CONTRAcrs § 231, at 349 (1963); 1
SAMUELWLUSTON, THE LAW OF CONTRACrS § 142, at 319 (1920).
183. See, e.g., Edwards v. Davis, 16 Johns. 281, 283 n. (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1819)
(asserting that moral obligation is consideration only where "there was an original
consideration ... which might have been enforced ... had it not been for some statute
provision, or some positive rule of law"); Wennall, 3 Bos. & Pul. at 249 n. (asserting in
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enforced not only promises reaffirming debts barred by infancy, the
statute of limitations, and bankruptcy, but also promises reaffirming
debts barred by the statute of frauds, statutes against usury, and the
common-law incapacity of married women, or coverture.
8 4
Conversely, some decisions rejected claims based in part on moral
obligation. 85 In some of these cases, however, the court did not reach
the moral-obligation claim, finding instead no promise or other
grounds for decision. 86 In other cases denying liability, the supposed
"moral obligation" sprang from a gratuitous promise itself and not
from any specific favor granted earlier to the promisor.'87 In still
others, the courts dispensed with a requirement of consideration
altogether when there was other evidence, such as formality, of intent
to be bound.' 88 The doctrinal landscape following Lord Mansfield's
dictum was hardly as fixed as the Mills court suggested. But Chief
Justice Parker chose to side with the reporter in Wennall, adopting his
theory that moral-obligation doctrine extended only to promises based
on pre-existing debt.
In so doing, Chief Justice Parker explicitly rejected his own
opinion in Bowers v. Hurd,189 in which the supreme judicial court
enforced a promise based solely on past good deeds. In Bowers, one
Sarah Thompson gave promissory notes to three of her friends,
including the plaintiff. 90 Thompson wished to leave something for the
plaintiff because the plaintiff had been a good friend and had
dictum that moral obligation renders enforceable only those promises affirming "imperative
duties" that would otherwise be unenforceable).
184. See, e.g., Davenport v. Mason, 13 Mass. 83, 93 (1818) (holding that subsequent
promise revived prior obligation otherwise barred by statute of frauds); Seago v. Deane, 4
Bing. 459, 461 (1828) (statute of frauds); Wells v. Horton, 2 Car. & P. 383, 385 (1826)
(statute of frauds and statute of limitations); Barnes v. Hedley, 2 Taunt. 184, 194 (1809)
(usury); Lee v. Muggeridge, 5 Taunt. 36, 38 (1813) (coverture); see also Glass v. Beach, 5
Vt. 170, 173 (1833) (enforcing promise reaffirming prior obligation to pay third party).
185. See, e.g., Fink v. Cox, 18 Johns. 145, 145 (1820) (refusing to enforce deceased
father's note promising son money because he was not as wealthy as his brother); cf Smith
v. Ware, 13 Johns. 257, 258 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1816) (holding seller of land was not liable for
subsequent promise to compensate buyer for inaccuracies in the deed, which itself made
clear that it contained only estimates); Fowler v. Shearer, 2 Mass. 14, 22-25 (1810) (refusing
to enforce promissory note).
186. See, e.g., Andover & Medford Turnpike Corp. v. Gould, 6 Mass. 39, 42-44
(1809) (finding no promise).
187. See, e.g., Fink, 18 Johns. at 145.
188. See, e.g., Bowers v. Hurd, 10 Mass. 427,429-30 (1813) (Parker, J.) (promissory
note).
189. 10 Mass. 427 (1813).
190. See id. at 427.
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"frequently attended" Thompson when she ill.' 9' Indeed, Thompson
felt an "obligation" to leave something for the plaintiff even though no
antecedent debt was involved.192 Thompson gave promissory notes in
order to avoid the expense of drafting a will.' 93 After she passed away,
her executor refused to honor the notes, and one of the promisees
sued.194 At trial, the defense pleaded lack of consideration, but the
judge "directed the jury to lay that evidence out of the case, and that a
verdict might notwithstanding be found for the plaintiff."'195 It was.
On appeal, the Supreme Judicial Court affirmed.' 96 Judge Parker,
writing for the court, rejected the executor's contention that the
promise lacked consideration. 97 He acknowledged that consideration
was a defense to enforcement of a note between the original two
parties.19' Instead, he offered a radical theory of consideration:
Now, we do not admit that, when one voluntarily makes a written
promise to another to pay a sum of money, the promise can be avoided
merely by proving there was no legal and valuable consideration
subsisting at the time; any more than, if he actually paid over the
amount of such note, he can recover it back again because he repents
of his generosity.
99
In other words, Parker analogized a promise to delivery of a gift.
This is precisely the analogy that consideration doctrine supposedly
rejects. A gratuitous promise is revocable absent reliance; a gratuitous
gift is irrevocable. Parker went on to justify enforcement of this
gratuitous promise by stressing the sham recital of consideration in the
note. By this recital, the promisor has "precluded himself and his
representatives from denying a consideration, when he has under his
hand acknowledged one."2°°  The court's refusal to weigh parol
evidence showing lack of consideration was later overruled, though
the Massachusetts courts insisted the Bowers case itself was correctly
decided on "other principles."20' The reporter of Bowers was left
wondering what those "other principles" were. Perhaps the case
191. Id.
192. Id.
193. See id.
194. See id.
195. d at428.
196. See id. at 430.
197. See id.
198. See id. at 429.
199. Id.
200. l
201. See Hill v. Buckminster, 5 Pick. 393 (1828).
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reflects confusion about the role of consideration in promissory notes.
Perhaps it simply reflects sympathy for a deserving plaintiff.
Whatever the explanation, it doesn't fit neatly into the universe of
moral obligation described by the same Justice Parker in Mills v.
yman. Bowers suggests that moral obligation could bind a gratuitous
promise that did not revive an antecedent debt.
Not surprisingly, Daniel Mills's counsel cited Bowers
prominently in support of his position. "[I]f there was no moral
obligation on the part of the defendant, it is sufficient that his promise
was in writing, and was made deliberately, with a knowledge of all the
circumstances."20 2 Davis and Allen added: "A man has a right to give
away his property," to which Chief Justice Parker replied, "There is a
distinction between giving and promising.' '2°  Mills's counsel
responded by pointing out that Bowers "does not take that
distinction." ' To which Justice Parker replied ominously: "That case
has been doubted."205 David Brigham, counsel for Seth Wyman,
distinguished Bowers in his written pleadings by contending that a
promissory note that recites consideration is a "privileged contract." '
It is not clear whether Justice Parker accepted this distinction or simply
thought his own earlier opinion was wrong. His opinion in Mills did
not discuss his opinion in Bowers. Thus Parker passed up an
opportunity to build on his holding in Bowers and to establish that a
promise founded on moral obligation should always be binding if there
is sufficient evidence of intent to be bound.
One unanswered question is whether Chief Justice Parker's
narrow doctrine of moral obligation comported with the view taken by
early American juries, who until 1810 had enjoyed broad powers to
find the law as well as the facts.207 The anecdotal evidence from Mills
v. Wman itself might suggest not. Despite doubts that Seth Wyman
made the promise at all, Bernard Fowler and the other citizens on the
jury in Mills v. iWman had no trouble finding him liable. Without a
thorough study of the behavior of juries in the eighteenth and early
nineteenth centuries, no definitive conclusion can be reached.
However, the demise of the jury's law-finding power suggests that
there was a vacuum in American common law and that Justice Parker
202. Mills v. Wyman, 20 Mass. (3 Pick.) 207,207 (1825).
203. Id.
204. Id.
205. Id.
206. Id.
207. See NELSON, supra note 141, at 165-71.
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and his contemporaries had a unique opportunity to fill that void. As
Professor Simpson puts it, the "dethronement of the jury" was
"accompanied by the generation or reception of law in order not so
much to replace or transform older doctrine as to provide law where
before there was little or none."
208
Insofar as there was doubt about the "reception" of Mansfield's
broad rule into American law, Mills helped seal its fate. Certainly that
is how Mills would later be remembered by Massachusetts courts and,
even later, by national commentators-as the case that settled doubts
about the scope of the moral-obligation rule.2°9 In the 170 years since
the decision in Mills, there is no mistaking its influence. It is one of
the two or three leading American cases on moral obligation, along
with Webb v. McGowin2t0 and perhaps the short per curiam decision in
Harrington v. Taylor.2 11 Mills is a staple of the first-year contracts
curriculum and is reprinted in virtually every American casebook on
the subject. 212 Its facts are the basis of the first illustration to section
86 of the most recent Restatement of Contracts.213
And yet Mills is more prominently featured in casebooks and
restatements than in actual contract cases. This is partly because moral
obligation cases are unusual, and therefore the doctrine, like
consideration doctrine generally, has more theoretical than practical
importance. While Mills may be the leading case on the doctrine in
Massachusetts,214 it is also occasionally cited in other jurisdictions.215
Of the hundreds of reported American contract cases involving moral-
obligation doctrine since 1826, Mills has been cited in only twenty-
208. Simpson, supra note 141, at 600.
209. See Dearborn v. Bowman, 36 Mass. 155, 158 (1841) ("The rule of law seems to
be now well settled-though it may have formerly been left in doubt .... ") (citing Mills and
its progeny).
210. 168 So. 196, 148 (Ala. Ct. App. 1935) (enforcing promise to reward another for
having saved the promisor's life).
211. 36 S.E.2d 227,227 (N.C. 1945) (declining to enforce promise to reward another
for having saved the promisor's life).
212. See, e.g., RANDY E. BARNETr, CONTRACTS 688 (1995); FARNswonm & YOuNG,
supra note 6, at 67.
213. See RESrATEmENT (SECoND) OFCONTRACrS § 86, cmt. a, illus. 1 (1981).
214. See Parish v. Stone, 28 Mass. 198, 202-03 (1833); Loomis v. Newhall, 15 Pick.
159, 163-64 (1833) (Putnam, J., who also sat on Mills); Dodge v. Adams, 19 Pick. 429,431
(1837); Valentine v. Foster, 1 Mete. 520, 521-22 (1840). These cases sometimes point to
Mills as the case that settled doubts about the scope of moral-obligation doctrine. See
Dearborn v. Bowman, 3 Metc. 155, 158 (1841); Mellen v. Whipple, 67 Mass. (1 Gray) 317,
321 (1854).
215. See, e.g., Kent v. Rand, 5 A. 760,761 (N.H. 1886) (citing Mills and a half-dozen
other cases).
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seven cases, and eleven of those were Massachusetts cases.216 Even in
Massachusetts, Mills appears most prominently in nineteenth-century
decisions and is quoted at length only in decisions in the first couple of
decades subsequent to the decision. 17 It has not been cited by a
Massachusetts court since 1906.218 Except for one Connecticut
decision,. 9 no reported case cited Mills until 1883.220 In the four
decades that followed, Mills was cited more than a dozen times
outside Massachusetts, but then gradually slipped into Shepards's
version of oblivion. It has not been cited by any American court since
1944.221
But counting citations underestimates the influence of Mills.
Like other famous cases, it achieved its fame through repeated citation
not in case law but in commentaries and, especially, casebooks. As
Richard Danzig has shown, for example, the renowned Hadley v.
Baxendale 2 owes its fame at least in part to the vigorous "marketing"
of the case by treatise editors who were themselves involved in the
litigation in Hadley.2 3  Although there is no evidence that David
Brigham, Charles Allen, or John Davis clamored to make Mills
famous, the case quickly became a fixture of the treatise world. Mills
figured prominently, for example, in the discussion of moral obligation
in Kent's Commentaries. The Commentaries, while acknowledging
that Mills did not end debate about the subject, treat Mills as the
leading case on moral obligation. Shortly after Mills, the second
edition of Kent's Commentaries intoned confidently that moral
obligation was consideration only where a "prior legal obligation had
once existed."224 But by the twelfth edition, the Commentaries were
rather less categorical. "[I]t has been an unsettled point whether a
216. See States Database, Cases File, LEXIS.
217. See cases cited supra, note 214.
218. See Widger v. Baxter, 76 N.E. 509, 510 (Mass. 1906) (refusing to enforce
promissory notes for lack of consideration).
219. See, e.g., Cook v. Bradley, 7 Conn. 57,64 (1828) (quoting Mills).
220. See Fruitt v. Anderson, 12 Ill. App. 427 (1883) (holding that father had no duty
to maintain an adult son).
221. See Sandelli v. Duffy, 38 A.2d 437,438 (Conn. 1944).
222. 156 Eng. Rep. 145 (Ct. Exch. 1854).
223. See Richard Danzig, Hadley v. Baxendale: A Study in the Industrialization of
the Law, 4 J. LEGAL STUD. 249,250,257-58 (1975).
224. KENr'S COMMENTARIES ON AMERICAN LAW 465 (2d ed. 1830) (citing Mills,
among other sources). By contrast, Blackstone seemed to envision a somewhat broader role
for moral consideration. Compare id., with 2 WniiAM BLAcKsTONE, COMMENTARIES ON
THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 444 (1766) ("A good consideration ... is that of blood or natural
affection between near relations." (emphasis in original)).
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mere moral obligation be, of itself, a sufficient consideration for a
promise" in cases not involving antecedent debt.' "The weight of
authority," it continued, "is that it is not sufficient."
226
The most important factor in Mills's rise to prominence was its
inclusion in Langdell's first casebook on contracts.227 Langdell
devoted sixty-seven pages of his casebook to the subject of "Moral
Consideration" and included a full report of Mills.228 Although Mills
was just one of more than a dozen cases in this section of the book, it
was the first American case encountered by the student and its facts
were among the most accessible.
Mills has not left the contracts curriculum since. Langdell's
sixty-seven pages have been whittled down to more modest sections.
Mills is typically one of just a handful of cases presented. It is usually
contrasted with Webb v. McGowin, in which an Alabama court
enforced McGowin's alleged promise to pay Webb for having saved
McGowin's life.229 Surely Mills, like Webb, deserves its place in the
casebooks. The facts of Mills, even if falsely rendered, are
compelling, and the opinion, even if misguided, is provocative. But
does the rule in Mills still deserve its place as a "fixed star in the
jurisprudential firmament"? 230 What, if any, theory of moral obligation
justifies the Mills doctrine?
IV. MILlS AND THEORIES OFMORAL OBLIGATION
A close reading of Mills helps answer two important questions
about moral-obligation doctrine. The first question is an empirical
one: Why do courts decide cases like Mills one way and cases like
Webb another? The second question is a normative one: Is moral
obligation doctrine just, and, if not, how should it be reformed? This
part takes up each question in turn.
225. KENT'S COMMENTARIES ON AMERICAN LAw 465 (12th ed. 1873) (citing Mills).
Holmes edited this edition of the Commentaries.
226. Id. Of course Mills also found its way into Corbin, Williston, and Farnsworth.
See CORBIN, supra note 182, § 231; E. AuAN FARNSWORTH, FARNSWORTH ON CONTRACTS
§ 2.8, at 57-58 (1990); WILL=SON, supra note 182, § 148.
227. See LANGDELL, supra note 6, at 367.
228. See id. at 339-406.
229. 168 So. 196, 198 (Ala. Ct. App. 1935).
230. GRANT GILMORE, THE DEATH OF CONTRACT 83 (1974) (referring to Hadley v.
Baxendale).
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A. 'Explaining Moral Obligation Cases
Courts and commentators have proposed several theories to
explain the structure of moral-obligation doctrine. These include a
waiver, or revival, theory; a theory based on the primacy of promise; a
restitutionary theory; a theory about the public/private distinction in
the law; and an economic theory.
The waiver theory was favored by Mills and other courts of its
day. Under that theory, a gratuitous promise is not normally
enforceable, no matter how compelling the attendant moral obligation,
but such a promise is enforceable if it revives a prior debt. On this
view, a debtor should have the power unilaterally to remove a
technical bar to enforcement of her own promise, just as a party to a
contract may unilaterally waive a condition that would otherwise
protect her from liability. This approach implies that the original
obligation is the paramount source of liability. The subsequent
promise is a mere ratification, subsidiary to the original wish of the
debtor. The best expression of the debtor's intent is the original
contract; that agreement is unenforceable not because of the debtor's
will, but because of the operation of some rule of public policy over
which the debtor had no control.231
One problem with the waiver theory is that it assumes the
promisor always has the power to remove a bar to enforcement of a
claim against him. It is true that some promisors possess such a
power. An adult may ratify the contracts of his infant self, for
example. But the power to waive is not so readily justifiable when
waiver implicates the interests of third parties. The Mills court, for
example, posited that a bankrupt should be able to reaffirm debts
discharged in bankruptcy. But if a bankrupt promises payment of only
some of his debts, he gives preferential treatment to some creditors
over others, possibly cutting against a public policy in favor of equal
231.
Express promises founded on such preexisting equitable obligations may be
enforced; there is a good consideration for them; they merely remove an
impediment created by law to the recovery of debts honestly due, but which
public policy protects the debtors from being compelled to pay... They are not
... naked pacts, but the voluntary revival or creation of obligation which before
existed in natural law, but which had been dispensed with ... principally for the
public convenience.
Mills v. Wyman, 20 Mass. (3 Pick.) 207, 209-10 (1825).
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distribution of assets among all creditors. 2 Even waiver of a defense
of the statute of limitations might implicate the interests of third
parties, including witnesses who would prefer not to be cross-
examined about the distant past and taxpayers who wish to save
judicial resources for fresher claims.23
Another problem with the waiver theory is that waivers are
supposedly retractable if they do not induce justifiable reliance, but in
fact the "waivers" in moral obligation cases are treated as irrevocable.
In other words, if the promisor "waives" a defense of the statute of
limitations or bankruptcy, why can't the promisor later retract the
waiver? One who waives a condition can arguably retract the waiver
before the other party relies on it, on the theory that no one has yet
been injured by the waiver. If the waiver induces justifiable reliance,
it becomes an irrevocable estoppel, at least in theory2 35 Unfortunately,
there seems to be some confusion about whether waivers are generally
retractable. Cases occasionally speak of binding waivers even when
there is no apparent reliance Y16 In other words, there may be some
support in the law for Mills's suggestion that a waiver can be
irrevocable even if it does not induce reliance.
There is one other problem with the waiver theory, however. As
Steve Thel and Edward Yorio point out, despite judicial rhetoric about
reviving old debts, courts treat the subsequent promise as a primary
source of liability and not as a technicality that permits suit on the
232. See 11 U.S.C. § 547 (1994) (prohibiting preference payments and establishing a
cause of action for return of preferences).
233. Indeed, states tend to look skeptically on private efforts to set aside statutes of
limitations. For example, "a clause inserted at the inception of a contract, by which a party
agreed not to plead the statute of limitations in the event of breach, would probably be held
void everywhere." JOHN DAwSON Er AL, CoNTRACrS: CASES AND MATERIALS 237-38 (6th
ed. 1993). Moreover, most states require "waivers!' of limitations defenses to be in the form
of a signed writing. See id. at 239.
234. See FARNSWO'rH, supra note 226, § 8.5, at 589-90.
235. See, e.g., Wood v. State, 186 N.E.2d 406, 408 (N.Y. 1962) (acknowledging
defense of justifiable reliance). Moreover, the reliance must be objectively verifiable. A
party seeking to enforce an estoppel must prove more than "some secret operation of his
own mind" in reliance on the other party's waiver. Id.
236. See, e.g., Phoenix Ins. Co. v. Ross Jewelers, Inc., 362 F2d 985,987-88 (5th Cir.
1966) (enforcing insurance company's waiver of a condition that insured maintain an
inventory of jewelry, even absent any evidence of insured's reliance on the waiver).
Compare Wisconsin Knife Works v. National Metal Crafters, 781 E2d 1280, 1287 (7th Cir.
1986) (Posner, J.) (asserting that reliance is an element of a waiver in U.C.C. § 2-209(5)),
with id. at 1291-92 (Easterbrook, J., dissenting) (arguing that reliance is not an element of
such a waiver).
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antecedent debt.237 Thel and Yorio correctly note that the courts tend
to focus on the promise itself, and on whether it has consideration,
rather than on the terms of the antecedent debt. Plaintiffs in these
cases seek to enforce the terms of the promise-the expectancy
measure, the hallmark of promise-based liability.238  One possible
response to this argument is that the courts focus on the promise only
because it defines the scope of the waiver. But that response does not
dispose of the rhetorical point. Courts almost invariably speak of these
cases as consideration cases, regardless of whether the original debt
itself sprang from contract law, tort law, or some other source. Courts
focus on the promise.
But Thel and Yorio go too far in stressing the primacy of the
promise in moral obligation cases. They argue that "[t]he cases may
simply show that courts are willing to enforce serious, well-considered
promises, but not rash and ill-considered promises."3 9  This
proposition may someday be proven true, but currently available
historical evidence does not support it. In support of their thesis, Thel
and Yorio contrast the supposedly well-considered promise in Webb v.
McGowin with the supposedly hasty promise in Mills. Noting that
Wyman himself repudiated his promise, whereas Webb's estate
repudiated his, Thel and Yorio suggest that "the promise in Mills was
more likely a response to a fleeting emotion of gratitude than the
promise in Webb.'"' They argue that, since McGowin's life was
saved at considerable detriment to Webb, McGowin had more
significant reasons to make his promise than did Wyman, whose son
died while Mills supposedly incurred minimal detriment. 24'
A close reading of the actual record in Mills does not bear out
these suppositions. As we have seen, Wyman's son apparently did not
die during the pendency of Mills v. Wyman. Even if Levi did die, Seth
Wyman certainly did not know that when he made his supposed
promise. He had every reason to believe that Daniel Mills had nursed
Levi back to health. More to the point, Wyman did not make a
promise to pay Levi's past debts at all. He bargained for future
services from Mills. Far from a hasty, off-the-cuff promise to pay
237. See generally Steve Thel & Edward Yorio, The Promissory Basis of Past
Consideration, 78 VA. L. REv. 1045 (1992) (arguing that promise, not restitution, explains
moral obligation cases).
238. Seeid.at 1100.
239. Id. at 1072.
240. Id.
241. See id.
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Levi's past debts, Seth's letter seems a carefully worded offer to pay
for new expenses. True, Justice Parker may not have entirely
appreciated this last point, but perhaps it influenced his view of the
case or that of his colleagues on the bench. And while Daniel Mills's
sacrifice pales next to that of Joe Webb, twenty-five dollars was still a
considerable sum in Mills's day; it hardly seemed "minimal" to him.
As for McGowin's promise, his attorneys say he never made the
promise in question.242 The irony is unmistakable: in both Mills and
Webb, the two leading cases on enforcement of promises via moral
obligation, the defendants say they never made any promise at all.
Recall, too, that McGowin's case was decided on demurrer, without
full fact-finding.243 Without further research into the background of
the McGowin case, it seems premature to conclude that his promise
was more carefully considered than that of Seth Wyman. The facts of
Mills point in the other direction. As an empirical matter, then, it is far
from clear that courts decide moral obligation cases on the quality of
the promise.
Another explanation for these cases is a theory of promissory
restitution. According to this theory, courts are actually granting the
plaintiff restitution for provision of services or goods in the past.
Courts emphasize the defendant's later promise, not because it
"waives" a technical defense or because it is binding in and of itself,
but because it negates the traditional presumption that the services
rendered were gratuitous.244 This theory was apparently endorsed by
the Second (though not the First) Restatement of Contracts. Section
86 provides:
(1) A promise made in recognition of a benefit previously received
by the promisor from the promisee is binding to the extent necessary to
prevent injustice.
(2) A promise is not binding under Subsection (1)
(a) if the promisee conferred the benefit as a gift or for other reasons
the promisor has not been unjustly enriched; or
242. See FARNSWORTH & YOUNG, supra note 180, at 121 n.a ("If was... the estate's
position that McGowin never made the promise alleged in Webb's complaint.").
243. See id.
244. See Melvin Aron Eisenberg, The Principles of Consideration, 67 CORNELL L.
REv. 640, 644-47 (1982); Stanley D. Henderson, Promises Grounded in the Past: The Idea
of Unjust Enrichment and the Law of Contracts, 57 VA. L. REv. 1115, 1157-61 (1971)
(arguing that a promissory "confession" enhances the "impressiveness" of a restitution
claim); Thel & Yorio, supra note 237, at 1071 (describing the restitution view). As to the
presumption of gratuitousness, see FARNSWORTH, supra note 226, § 2.20, at 152-53.
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(b) to the extent that its value is disproportionate to the benefit.245
The provision is apparently intended to explain and codify the
results in cases like Mills and Webb.246 It distinguishes the cases on the
grounds that the benefit to Seth Wyman was not received "directly" by
him from Daniel Mills, whereas the benefit to McGowin was received
directly from Webb.247 Its link to restitution is evident from subsection
(a), which bars a cause of action if the promisor was not "unjustly
enriched."248
As a theory of recovery, this notion has some appeal, but as an
empirical explanation for the actual behavior of courts, it is imperfect.
The theory is rhetorically inconsistent with the case law. Before the
advent of section 86, courts rarely spoke of moral obligation cases in
terms of "unjust enrichment" or restitution.249 They instead handled
these cases as consideration cases. This was true whether or not the
courts enforced the promise. Even after section 86, some courts
continue to conceptualize these cases as consideration cases more than
restitution cases' 0
The promissory-restitution theory also shares some of the defects
of the "waiver" theory espoused by Mills itself. The restitution theory
suggests that the real cause of action is based on the services rendered
in the past, not on the promise made in the present, even though the
contemplated remedy is enforcement of the promise rather than
restitutionary recovery for past services. It is the promise that is held
"binding" by section 86, not the earlier debt. Moreover, "a promise to
pay a liquidated sum may serve to fix the amount due if in all the
circumstances it is not disproportionate to the benefit."'
245. RFSrA EmENT (SECOND) oFCoNTRACTS § 86 (1981).
246. See id cmt. a, illus. 1; Charles L. Knapp, Reliance in the Revised Restatement-
The Proliferation of Promissory Estoppel, 81 COLUM. L. REV. 52, 53 n.10 (1981).
247. See Thel & Yorio, supra note 237, at 1070-71.
248. REsTAaEENr (SEcoND) OFCoNTRACrS § 86(1981).
249. See supra notes 209-211,214-215 & 218-221 (citing cases).
250. See, e.g., Womer Agency, Inc. v. Doyle, 479 N.E.2d 468, 473-74 (Ill. App. Ct,
1985) (stating that "a moral obligation yield[s] an implied consideration" for a subsequent
promise).
251. RFsrATEMENT(SECOND) OFCONTRACTs § 86, cmt. i (1981). This comment does
add that enforcement of the promise will be limited by the amount of the benefit conferred,
if the benefit was a liquidated sum of money. See id. "A promise which is excessive may
sometimes be enforced to the extent of the value of the benefit, and the remedy may be
thought of as quasi-contractual rather than contractual." Id In other words, the expectancy
remedy would give way to the restitution remedy if the latter were smaller. But, of course, it
is unusual for the promisor to promise more than the amount of the antecedent debt.
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Perhaps this remedial discrepancy can be explained away by
arguing that the promise is like a limited waiver of the presumption of
gratuity. The promisor acknowledges that some services were done in
expectation of payment but maintains that other services were
gratuitous and thus not compensable. This scenario may be plausible
in those cases, like Mills, in which the Good Samaritan's initial actions
in an emergency are gratuitous but his extended service is done in
expectation of payment. 2 But in many cases the services are either
gratuitous or they are not. Can it really be maintained that McGowin
acknowledged that some part of Webb's life-saving service was done
in expectation of payment and that the rest was gratuitous?
Thus, there is some disjunction between the right described by
section 86 and the remedy normally contemplated for it. This, in itself,
is not a fatal flaw in a theory of liability. Contract law is riddled with
remedies that don't match rights. The expectancy interest is
sometimes awarded in reliance cases. 3 The reliance interest is
sometimes awarded in consideration cases. 4  But the lack of
connection between right and remedy does suggest that the
Restatement formulation is an incomplete explanation of what in fact
courts were doing before section 86. It is not fully consistent with
either the rhetoric (consideration) or the remedy (expectancy) typically
employed by those courts. Like its more famous cousin, section 90,
section 86 is not so much a restatement of existing law as a blueprint
for future law. As international lawyers say, it is more an example of
progressive development than of codification."
Duncan Kennedy offers still another explanation for moral-
obligation doctrine. He suggests that the doctrine is motivated by a
desire to avoid litigation and its attendant "legalization" of family
relations. 6 Viewed in this light, the doctrine of moral obligation is
but one of many designed to preserve the public/private distinction and
252. Cf FARNSWORTH, supra note 226, § 2.20, at 106 n.29 (suggesting that Mills
might have had a restitution claim against Levi because Mills's services lasted for a long
time).
253. See, e.g., Ricketts v. Scothom, 77 N.W. 365, (Neb. 1898) (finding liability based
on reliance, but awarding the amount promised rather than the amount of the promisee's
reliance).
254. See generally L.L. Fuller & William R. Perdue, Jr., The Reliance Interest in
Contract Damages: 2,46 YALELJ. 373 (1937) (collecting cases).
255. Cf. U.N. CHARTER, art. 13, para 1 (charging the General Assembly to encourage
progressive development and codification of international law principles). The wisdom of
section 86 is taken up infra Part IV.B.
256. See Duncan Kennedy, Form and Substance in Private Law Adjudication, 89
HARv. L REv. 1685, 1727 (1976).
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to keep-some private injustices out of the courts. This is an accurate
description of much of the rhetoric of the moral obligation cases.
Mills explicitly consigns such cases to a private "interior forum," the
tribunal of the conscience. Still, Kennedy's formulation is both under-
and over-inclusive. On the one hand, it does not explain why courts
sometimes enforce family promises when consideration is technically
present. s7 On the other, it does not explain why courts do not enforce
business and other "public" promises when consideration is
technically absent.
On the other end of the ideological spectrum, Richard Posner
offers an economic explanation for moral-obligation doctrine. In those
cases involving promises that revive uncollectable debts, "the utility of
the promise to the promisor is often great and the costs of enforcement
low."5 8  Utility is often high because the promise may convey
information about the promisor's creditworthiness that will later inure
to the promisor's benefit by enhancing her reputation for owning up to
her debts. Enforcement costs may be no higher than the presumably
acceptable costs associated with enforcing the original debt. 9 As for
promises to rescuers and Good Samaritans-cases like Webb and
Mills-Posner argues that enforcement makes the promise worth more
to all parties involved, at relatively little cost. If the promise is not
enforceable, the promisor will be tempted to give a one-time lump-
sum transfer instead, and this transfer might have a much smaller
present value than a promised stream of payments, for example the
fifteen dollars per week in Webb.26° This is a variant of his argument
for enforceability of gratuitous promises generally: enforcement
enhances the value of the promise.261
257. See, e.g., Hamer v. Sidway, 27 N.E. 256, 257 (N.Y 1891) (uncle's promise to
nephew); Ricketts v. Scothom, 77 N.W. 365, 366 (Neb. 1898) (grandfather's promise to
granddaughter). But cf. FARNSWOaTH & YOUNG, supra note 6, at 85 (quoting Kirksey v.
Kirksey, 8 Ala. 131 (1845) (declining to enforce brother-in-law's promise to let sister
Antillico "have a place" to raise her family "[i]f you will come down and see me")).
258. Richard A. Posner, Gratuitous Promises in Economics and Law, 6 J. LEGAL
STUD. 411,418-19 (1977).
259. Seeid. at418.
260. See id. at 418-19.
261. Seeid. at411-13.
[I]f A cannot bind himself to make a series of future gifts, he may be led to
substitute a one-time transfer, the present value of which is less than that of the
series of future gifts, although greater than that of a declared but unenforceable
intention to make a series of future gifts. Thus, nonenforceability of gratuitous
promises could tend to bias transfers excessively toward immediacy.
Id. at 413 (citation omitted).
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Like the Restatement formulation, this economic analysis is more
useful as a normative than an explanatory tool. There is no hint in any
of the pleadings or opinions in Mills that it ever occurred to anyone
that it might be more efficient to enforce gratuitous promises.
Moreover, the "invisible hand" of the marketplace of judicial ideas has
not moved courts toward the supposedly more efficient solution:
courts stubbornly cling to precedent instead. Posner's analysis
presents a persuasive case for what the law should be but does not
explain what courts in fact have done to date.
What, then, does explain the behavior of courts in moral
obligation cases? A complete answer to this question requires a
rigorous historical analysis of all the relevant cases, not just of Mills v.
Wyman. Nonetheless, the disparity between the reported and the
historical facts of Mills suggests some interesting lines of inquiry.
Most intriguing is the possibility that the "moral obligee" tends to
misinterpret an ambiguous statement by the "moral obligor" as a
promise to satisfy the moral obligation. In the two leading moral
obligation cases, Mills and Webb, the supposed promisor asserted that
he never made the promise in question. Perhaps this is a pattern in
moral obligation cases.262 If such a pattern exists, it might suggest that
moral obligees tend to misconstrue statements of gratitude by moral
obligors as promises, or, conversely, that moral obligors tend to lie
about their promises, or that the estates of moral obligors are
consistently less generous than the obligors themselves. Any one of
these conclusions might suggest that most moral obligation cases
involve some basic misunderstanding about the obligor's intentions
and that courts are not likely to impose liability if they doubt that the
promise was made in the first place. In other words, further research
might prove Thel and Yorio correct-that these cases depend primarily
on the quality of the moral obligor's promise.
B. Reforming Moral-Obligation Doctrine
A close study of Mills has implications for the normative aspects
of moral-obligation doctrine as well. In absolving Seth Wyman from
liability, the Massachusetts courts focused on whether he got
262. In a third leading case, the supposed promisor did not clearly admit that he made
the promise; the case was resolved on demurrer. See Demurrer, Harrington v. Taylor, No.
8442, Superior Court of Richmond County, North Carolina (1944), para. 5, reprinted in
Record, Harrington v. Taylor, No. 594, Supreme Court of North Carolina (1945), at 8 ("[I]t
appears from the complaint that whatever promise the defendant made to the plaintiff as to
payment was for a past consideration, is not enforcible in law and is nudum pactum.").
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consideration for his promise, not on whether he intended to be legally
bound, whether he was liable in restitution, or indeed whether he was
morally bound to pay Mills. This raises three normative questions.
First, should morality be the controlling principle in these cases?
Second, should the law instead stress their restitutionary component?
Finally, should the moral obligor's promise be the primary basis for
liability, and if so should it be subject to a requirement of
consideration?
The first question is the easiest. It is doubtful that moral
obligation alone can be the touchstone of enforceability. Holmes and
Parker are right: there will always be a distinction between moral and
legal obligations. In part, this is so because there are some relatively
minor moral duties that are too costly to enforce. Few people would
want to enforce a moral duty to keep a dinner date, for example; the
social and monetary costs of enforcement far outweigh any benefit to
the disappointed diner.263
But the distinction between the legal and the moral also reflects
concern that a "rule" of moral obligation would make everyone liable
for everything. There are far too many moral duties for the law to
enforce. In most moral systems, moral obligations spring from all
sorts of human statements and actions, not just from promises. Ronald
Dworkin gives some examples of statements that are not promises:
statements of intention, expressions of preference, explanations of
conduct, or even legislative history.264 These statements might create
lesser moral duties than promises do, since they might induce reliance
or raise expectations on the part of others, even if they do not involve a
clear personal commitment to do something.265 However, they still
create some lesser degree of moral duty. Wyman's letter may fall into
this "intermediate 266 category of moral responsibility. Although it
does not explicitly promise to pay Mills's past expenses, it does
promise to pay future expenses, and, more importantly, it suggests an
explanation for this promise: Wyman's concern for his son's well-
being. Wyman asks Mills to "take all possible care" of Levi and to
263. See, e.g., FARNSWORTH & YOUNG, supra note 6, at 150 n.a (citing Horsley v.
Chesselet, Small Claims Action No. 346278, Municipal Court, San Francisco (1978)
(denying claim for $32 expended for gasoline and theater tickets for a date, on grounds that
"the promise to engage in a social relationship for one evening" was unenforceable)).
264. See RoNAD DwoRN , LAw's EMPRE 344-45 (1986).
265. See id. ("[M]y earlier explanatory statement is part of my moral record,
something for which I must take responsibility because I made the statement knowing others
would probably rely on it and encouraging them to do so.").
266. See id. at 344.
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"write again immediately" to report on Levi's health.267 These
statements may not amount to promises, but they might justify Mills
hope for payment for the services already rendered.
Actions, too, might create moral duties. Even relationships can
create moral duties. If Seth Wyman's words did not create such a
moral duty, Seth may still have been morally responsible by virtue of
his relationship to his son. Quite simply, it is impractical to enforce all
moral duties; there are too many of them.
Conversely, there are some nonmoral duties that should be
enforced because enforcement is efficient-that is, because the
benefits of enforcement outweigh the costs. It is hard to imagine a
moral system that demands that people drive on the right side of the
road, or that acceptance be effective on dispatch, but legal systems
routinely enforce such obligations. As H.L.A. Hart said, "[t]he rules of
international law, like those of municipal law, are often morally quite
indifferent. '2 68 This is not to say that rules of law are always or usually
morally indifferent. There must be some overlap between law and
morality, even if that overlap is more complete in some areas than
others. But some statements and actions should give rise to legal
liability even if they do not involve moral obligations. Some division
between law and morality is inevitable.
If morality cannot be the sole basis for determining liability,
should it play any role in "moral" obligation doctrine? Morality has
been imported into the Second Restatement but ironically serves only
to limit recovery of the deserving plaintiff. Section 86 of the
Restatement says a promise based on "past consideration" is
enforceable unless the plaintiff was not "unjustly" enriched.269 Thus, a
defendant's promise, a statement that usually creates a moral
obligation, is made nonbinding if the plaintiff is not morally deserving.
As Thel and Yorio point out, this approach tends to be
underinclusive.270 Judges, trained to think rationally rather than
emotionally, resist imposing their (or the plaintiff's) morals on the
defendant.
267. Record, Mills, supra note 22 (Letter of Seth Wyman to Daniel Mills).
268. H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 223 (1961). Hart made this point to
demonstrate that international law is not just a collection of moral precepts, as some critics
imply. See, e.g., JOHN AUSTIN, THE PROVINCE OF JURISPRUDENCE DETERMINED AND THE
USES OF THE STUDY OF JURISPRUDENCE 133, 201 (1954) (asserting that international
obligations "are enforced by moral sanctions," not by legal ones).
269. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 86 (1981).
270. See Thel & Yorio, supra note 237, at 1074-85.
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In addition to incorporating a moral component, section 86
incorporates restitution law. This brings us to our second major
question: Should restitution be the primary basis for liability in moral
obligation cases? At first blush, restitution would seem to be an
underinclusive theory of liability. It has traditionally been an unduly
stingy source of recovery. It is axiomatic that Daniel Mills had no
restitution claim against Seth Wyman; his restitution claim, if any, was
against Levi.27' Under some moral systems, however, Seth Wyman
was "unjustly" enriched by Mills's services even if he didn't promise
to pay for them, since a good father would have provided the same
services for the son regardless of the son's age. Similarly, McGowin
was "unjustly enriched" by Webb, but restitution doctrine traditionally
treats Webb's heroics as gratuitous; if McGowin had not made his
promise, Webb might not have recovered.
Still, restitution doctrine could be readily reformed to make it,
and thus section 86, more fair and efficient. Take the traditional
presumption that nonprofessionals act gratuitously when they help
others in an emergency. Joe Webb's nonprofessional status supposedly
distinguishes his case from Cotnam v. Wisdom,272 in which a doctor did
recover in restitution for unsuccessful efforts to save the life of an
injured man in an emergency.27 3 This distinction belies common
sense. The law should encourage rescue, not ignore it. Why should it
matter whether the rescuer is an amateur or an expert? Economic
analysis says restitution doctrine is really an effort to recreate the deal
the parties would have made had they had the opportunity to
bargain.274 In an emergency, most people would hire whatever help
was available, professional or otherwise, and would probably pay
exorbitant prices for it. Yet the restitution plaintiff is denied even the
reasonable value of her services.
What's more, the law does not just ignore efforts to rescue, it
punishes negligent rescue. The bad man who ignores the baby
drowning in a lake is generally not liable for anything.275 The Good
271. See FARNSWORTH, supra note 226, § 2.20, at 106 ("Mills may have had a claim
in restitution against the son.").
272. 104 S.W. 164 (Ark. 1907).
273. See FARNSWORTH & YOUNG, supra note 180, at 115.
274. See RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 97-98 (2d ed. 1977)
(arguing that restitution doctrine attempts to replicate the deal the parties would have made
had the transaction costs of bargaining not been prohibitive).
275. See, e.g., Hurley v. Eddingfield, 59 N.E. 1058, 1058 (Ind. 1901) (declining to
hold physician liable for refusing to aid a person suffering from "violent sickness" leading to
death).
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Samaritan who attempts to rescue the baby will get nothing in
restitution if successful, and will get slapped with liability if
negligent.276 Gratuitousness simply should not bar recovery for
services rendered in good faith by a nonprofessional in an emergency.
It should instead be relevant primarily to the measure of damages. The
doctor who treats the injured person on the street should recover at a
higher rate than a layperson who attempts the same treatment. Of
course the law should continue to discourage officious conduct by
denying recovery to the intermeddler and by imposing liability on the
negligent rescuer. But these disincentives should be offset by some
incentive to rescue. Our society suffers more from apathy than
altruism.
277
In sum, a reformed restitution doctrine might be a plausible basis
for recovery in moral obligation cases. Nonetheless, even a reformed
restitution doctrine would inject needless uncertainty into these cases.
The judicial costs of enforcement of a restitution-based rule will often
be considerable. One arguable advantage of promissory liability is that
it is easier and cheaper to administer. Restitution-based liability may
often depend on detailed and costly fact-finding, whereas promise-
based liability may simply require a judge to read the terms of a
promise.
This raises the third question: Should a naked promise by the
moral obligor be the primary source of legal liability? Usually our law
maintains that a gratuitous promise is not binding absent bargained-for
consideration or foreseeable reliance. Should the law recognize an
exception for gratuitous promises by moral obligors?
The answer is a resounding yes. A promise to fulfill a moral
obligation should be binding regardless of whether it is supported by
consideration. It should be enough for the plaintiff to prove that the
defendant's promise was made with intent to be legally bound. The
existence of a past "moral obligation" should be treated as prima facie
evidence that the moral obligor does intend to be bound. In other
words, the moral obligation should establish a rebuttable presumption
that the promise was made with intent to be bound. For that matter,
even gratuitous promises that do not relate to a moral obligation
276. See, e.g., Farwell v. Keaton, 240 N.W.2d 217, 219 (Mich. 1976) (holding doctor
liable for negligent rescue).
277. At least section 86 frees the plaintiff from one other traditional bar to recovery in
restitution: measuring the benefit to the defendant. Section 86 contemplates enforcement of
the defendant's promise, which is much simpler than calculating the benefit conferred by the
plaintiff.
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should be enforceable if there is other evidence of intent to be bound.
This evidence might include formalities such as a particular type of
writing, a certain set of words, or even legalization by a notary. Again,
such evidence should establish a rebuttable presumption of intent to be
legally bound. No additional requirement of consideration should be
imposed.
Economic analysis fumishes a familiar but compelling
justification for enforcing gratuitous promises, whether or not they are
related to a pre-existing moral obligation. As Posner says, a naked
promise is worth more if it is enforceable.27 The promisee will value
it more highly. And the promisor will be able to structure the promise
in a financially rational way, like promising a stream of payments into
the future.279
One possible objection to this economic justification is that a rule
of liability based on intent to be bound would be more costly to
administer than the current rule of liability based on consideration. It
seems likely, however, that a system of enforcing gratuitous promises
would be less costly than the. current system. To "opt in" to liability
under the current system, the promisor must understand the
consideration rule and must refashion her promise, perhaps by
extracting nominal consideration from the promisee. McGowin can
ask Webb for a peppercorn; Wyman can ask Mills to do something
additional for Levi. This rigmarole imposes unnecessary transaction
costs on the promisor. Those costs include not only the time and
trouble of cobbling together some sham consideration but also the
more significant costs of becoming aware of the consideration rule in
the first place. This may require hiring an attorney. By contrast, it
would be easier and cheaper to "opt out" of a system that enforced
gratuitous promises. Any such system would rely on formal device,
such as a writing or a seal, to make a promise binding. To avoid
liability, one simply would avoid using the formal device. This rule
would be more readily understandable than the consideration doctrine,
which confounds lay people at least as much as it confounds attorneys.
Indeed, the simplicity of a "formality" rule is one of its greatest
attractions. Most Americans probably think that formality, not
consideration, is the linchpin of enforceability. A simple rule of form
would be easier to understand than the consideration doctrine and thus
would make it easier for people to plan and go about their business.
278. See Pbsner, supra note 258, at418.
279. See id.
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Such a rule could apply to all promises-to unilateral gratuitous
promises as well as to bilateral contracts.
In other areas, commercial law has already responded to the
reality of the workaday world. Contracts are interpreted in light of
trade usage, course of performance, and course of dealing."' This
trend extends to the consideration doctrine as well. In sales contracts,
options are binding without consideration, as are modifications."
And, of course, a few states have adopted statutes to enforce certain
promises-usually written promises-given to satisfy past
obligations.282 The international law of business transactions has also
dispensed with any requirement of consideration.n 3 In the civil-law
world, the consideration doctrine is largely unknown. 2 4 Other
analogous bodies of law also reject it. The public international law of
treaties, for example, imposes no consideration requirement,'
Indeed, public international law apparently recognizes that unilateral
280. See RESrATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACrS § 203 (1981); U.C.C. §§ 2-208, 1-
205.
281. See, e.g., U.C.C. § 2-209(1) ("An agreement modifying a contract within this
Article needs no consideration to be binding."); U.C.C. § 2-205 (providing for option
contracts without consideration).
282. See, e.g., N.Y. GEN. OBUG. LAW § 5-1105 (McKinney 1989) (providing for
enforcement of a written, signed promise "if the consideration is expressed in the writing"
and "would be a valid consideration but for the time when it was given or performed"); CAL.
CIV. CODE § 1606 (Deering 1994) (stating that "a moral obligation originating in some
benefit conferred upon the promisor, or prejudice suffered by the promisee, is also a good
consideration for a promise"). A few other western states and Guam have adopted statutes
based on the California statute. See, e.g., 18 GUAM CODE ANN. § 85502; MONT. CODE ANN.
§ 28-2-802 (1995); N.D. CENT. CODE § 9-05-02 (1987); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 107
(West 1983); S.D. CODIFIED LAws § 53-6-2 (Michie 1990); see also GA. CODE ANN. § 13-3-
41 (1982) (providing for good consideration where there is a "strong moral obligation"); LA.
CIV. CODE ANN. art. 1760 (West 1987) (same).
According to Henderson, the California statute has been narrowly interpreted so that it
now constitutes "nothing more than an expression of existing common law." Henderson,
supra note 244, at 1115, 1129-33.
283. See U.N. Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods, U.N.
Doc. A/CONF.97/18, arts. 14-24 (1980) (formation rules) (omitting any requirement of
consideration); UNIDROIT Principles, Art. 1-5 (similar).
284. The civilian doctrine of causa bears only a passing resemblance to consideration
doctrine. See generally Arthur T. von Mehren, Civil-Law Analogues to Consideration: An
Exercise in Comparative Analysis, 72 HARV. L REV. 1009 (1959) (analyzing the techniques
used in French and German law to resolve problems handled by the doctrine of
consideration in common law).
285. See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969, U.N. Doc.
A/CONF.39/27, art. 2(1)(a) (defining a treaty without reference to consideration as "an
international agreement concluded between States in written form and governed by
international law").
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gratuitous promises can be binding if there is evidence of a good-faith
intent to be bound.8 6
Replacing consideration with some formal requirement, such as a
writing, would better achieve the goals of the consideration doctrine.
Such a formality can impose caution on the promisor, provide
evidence of the transaction, and distinguish gift promises from
business transactions. As Professor Fuller put it, "concern for formal
guaranties justifiably diminishes where the promise is backed by a
moral obligation to do the thing promised."2 87 The trend in the law is
unmistakable: consideration doctrine is on the way out, and not a
moment too soon. Consideration doctrine, if indeed it was ever useful,
has outlived its utility. The next century will see the end of
consideration as we know it.
V. CONCLUSION
How odd that Holmes thought that the confusion between law
and morality was most pronounced in the law of contract.2 8 The
opposite seems true. Contract law seems relatively amoral, as law
goes. Punitive damages are generally not awarded for breach, not even
for "willful" or deliberate breach.289  One-sided transactions are
286. See Nuclear Tests Case (Austl. v. Fr.), 1974 I.C.J. 253, 267-70 (Dec. 20)
(asserting that France was legally bound by its unilateral promises to halt nuclear testing,
even though no other state had relied on those promises).
The literature abounds with grim warnings not to draw analogies between the law of
treaties and.the law of contract. See, e.g., EVANGELOS RAFrOPOULOS, THE INADEQUACY OF
THE CONTRACTUAL ANALOGY IN THE LAW OF TREATiES 207-54 (1990) (arguing that
legislation, not contract, is a more useful analog to treaty law); SHABTAI ROSENNE, THE
MODERN LAW OF TREATiES 128 (1989) (calling analogy "simply false"); cf. R srATEMENT
(THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAw OF THE UNrrED STATES § 147 (1987) (advising
"caution"). I have gleefully disregarded these warnings. See generally Geoffrey R. Watson,
The Death of Treaty, 55 OHIo ST. L.L 781 (1994) (comparing the rise of international
promissory estoppel with its contract-law counterpart).
287. Lon L. Fuller, Consideration and Form, 41 COLUM. L. REv. 799, 821-22
(1941).
288. See Holmes, supra note 1, at 461-62.
289. See, e.g., White v. Benkowski, 155 N.W.2d 74,77 (Wis. 1967).
Of course, there is some authority that a "willful" breach might affect a choice between
competing compensatory measures. Compare Jacob & Youngs, Inc. v. Kent, 129 N.E. 889,
891 (N.Y 1921) (Cardozo, J.) (suggesting that lesser "diminution-of-value" damages were
appropriate because the breach was neither "fraudulent nor willful"), and Peevyhouse v.
Garland Coal & Mining Co., 382 P.2d 109, 114 (Okla. 1962) (awarding only diminution-of-
value damages for deliberate breach), with Groves v. John Wunder Co., 286 N.W. 235, 238
(Minn. 1939) (awarding "cost-of-repair" damages in arguably analogous circumstances).
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enforced so long as there is some minimal consideration. ' Gratuitous
promises are not enforceable, no matter how earnestly made.29' And,
as Mills decided, moral obligation is generally not consideration for a
promise.292 These things were as true in Holmes's day as today. The
examples Holmes gives of excessive morality-the law of conditions,
the law of interpretation-seem more devoid of moral content than
most areas of criminal law, constitutional law, and even tort law. In
contract law, the amoral approach of Mills seems more the rule than
the exception.
This Article has proposed a reform that would put morality back
into moral-obligation doctrine. I have argued that a moral obligor
should be legally as well as morally bound to perform a promise to
fulfill a pre-existing moral obligation, regardless of whether the
promise is supported by consideration. For that matter, I have argued
that a gratuitous promise should always be enforceable if the promisor
intended to be legally bound, regardless of whether there is
consideration for the promise. The Article has argued for these
reforms principally on economic grounds: the new rules would be
economically efficient because they would make promises more
valuable at relatively little social cost. This increase in allocational
efficiency is itself sufficient justification for the proposed change. But
these reforms would have the added virtue of linking legal liability
more closely to moral responsibility. The law cannot codify every
tenet of morality. Some moral matters must indeed be left to the
"tribunal of conscience," just as some nonmoral questions must be
adjudicated in the tribunal of the state. But moral-obligation law is
one area of the law in which the supposed tension between economics
and morality is a false dichotomy. The proposed reform of the Mills
doctrine would be both efficient and moral.
Still, even if the rule of Mills v. iman is eventually discarded,
the case itself will still deserve a prominent place in casebooks on
contracts. The case will always have historical significance as the first
major American doctrinal statement on the question. The opinion
provides students with a colorful example of forceful legal writing.
Perhaps most importantly, it provides contracts teachers with a simple
but compelling hypothetical for discussion in class. It puts an abstract
290. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACrS § 79(b) (1981) (dismissing any
requirement of "equivalence in the values exchanged").
291. See id. at § 17(1) (stating that "the formation of a contract requires a bargain").
292. See generally FARNSWORTH, supra note 226, § 2.8, at 54-61.
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question on the scope of promissory liability into an accessible factual
context.
This last point will not sit well with, critics of the case method.
Some contend, not implausibly, that the case method is more effective
at teaching the facts than teaching the holdings of cases. True enough,
many lawyers remember great common-law cases more for their facts
than their reasoning. Ask a lawyer about the holding of Mills v.
Wynan and you probably get a blank look. Ask if the lawyer
remembers the case about father promising to pay the Good Samaritan
for caring for the sick son, and you may get a smile of recognition. A
former public defender once told me that her clients sometimes
asserted they were lawyers, and she would test them by asking if they
recognized the facts-not the holdings-of great cases. Mills v.
Iiman is such a case. Everyone remembers the facts; no one
remembers the holding.
For Mills, perhaps that is the way it should be. The rule in the
case is eminently forgettable: it is as incoherent as it is inefficient. It
will be a dead letter in another hundred years. But the facts of the case
are memorable. Indeed, the story told by Justice Parker-Seth's hasty
promise in a fleeting moment of gratitude, the death of Levi Wyman,
Seth's willingness to stand up in court and be counted as a scoundrel-
is more compelling than the story told by the surviving documents, in
which Seth makes no promise, Levi does not die, and Seth deserves to
win. For the law teacher, the reported facts are more convenient than
the historical truth because they more poignantly illustrate the tension
between law and morality. For the law student, the reported facts
stand as a morality play for lawyers and as a reminder of the limits of
the profession. The mythical facts of Mills are an important part of our
legal culture. They lurk somewhere in our collective interior forum, in
the tribunal of conscience.
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